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A Patent Panacea?
THE PROMISE OF CORBINIZED CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Jonathan L. Moore*
A patent's claims define the scope of a patent-holder's right to exclude
others. Because patent infringement actions often hinge on how a court construes
claim terms, the interpretative approach that a court uses has a significant effect
on the scope ofpatent rights.
This article examines claim construction through the lens of contract law.
In theory, the Federal Circuit has explicitly rejected the application of contract
interpretation principles to claim construction, despite historical acceptance of
the patent-contract analogy. In practice, however, the Federal Circuit applies the
theory of contract interpretation espoused by Samuel Williston, a theory that
focuses on the text of the document itself
Unfortunately, this approach has resulted in a claim construction
jurisprudence that lacks certainty and divides the judiciary. Accordingly, this
article argues that courts should construe patent claims by following the theory of
contract interpretation outlined by Williston's rival, Arthur Corbin-a theory that
values substance over form. If applied in the patent context, this theory would
expand the quality of sources used to interpret a claim and mitigate the problems
spawned by the use of a Willistonian approach. In light of these advantages,
Corbinized claim construction offers a doctrinal solution to the problems
plaguing the Federal Circuit's current claim construction jurisprudence.
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Introduction
The "correct" method of interpreting any legal document is far from
settled. Whether it is a statute, a contract, or some other text, if it contains words,
it will probably require interpretation at some point, either by the public,
individuals, or courts Unfortunately, there is no "lawyer's paradise where all
words have a fixed, precisely ascertained meaning... and where, if the writer has
been careful, a lawyer ... may sit in his chair, inspect the text, and answer all
questions without raising his eyes." 2  Accordingly, a vast array of scholarship
exists proposing, and critiquing, various methods of interpretation for each of
these types of documents.
3
1 See, e.g., 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2470, at 404 (2d ed. 1923) ("The truth had finally been
recognized that words always need interpretation; that the process of interpretation inherently and
invariably means the ascertainment of the association between words and external objects.., the
fact is that there must always be interpretation.").
2 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 428-
29 (2d ed. 1898); see also Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.) ("A word is not
a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in
color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.").
'See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, Judicial Construction of Written Documents, 59 NW. U. L. REV.
751, 753 (1965) ("The Anglo-American rules for interpreting written documents are many and
variable. Some are verbose, some pithy; some are specific, some general; some are statutory,
some judge-made."). See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track
Theory of Interpretation, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 397 (2004) (outlining competing theories of
contract interpretation); R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four
Main Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV.
121 (1994) (outlining competing theories of constitutional interpretation); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989) (outlining competing
theories of statutory interpretation).
9 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 2
Copyright © 2010, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
A recurring theme in interpretative debates is the question of form versus
substance.4 Some scholars argue for the strict interpretation of legal documents,
narrowly interpreting them based primarily, if not completely, on the text itself.
5
In contrast, other scholars argue for the broad interpretation of legal documents,
seeking to interpret these documents in a manner that effectuates the substance
and underlying purpose.6 Central to this debate is the role that extrinsic evidence,
or evidence outside of the text itself, should play in interpretation.
7
Unsurprisingly, a similar debate is occurring over the best method of
interpreting a patent. 8  Since its creation in 1982, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which retains exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
in patent cases,9 has been sharply divided over this precise question.10
Specifically, the court has split over the proper method of interpreting a patent's
"claims," -single-sentence statements at the end of the patent document which
define the scope of the patented invention.12  When a patent-holder brings an
infringement action to enforce his or her patent rights, these claims must be
interpreted, a process that is known as claim construction.
13
Given the broad protections provided to patent-holders in the United
States, the interpretative approach used by the Federal Circuit can have a
significant impact.1 4 A patent gives its owner the power to prevent others from
4 See Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 496, 496 (2004) (noting that "almost all applications of legal doctrine turn on
questions of interpretation; and almost all questions of interpretation implicate the tension between
form and substance"). Indeed, some scholars have traced debates over this issue back to early
English common law courts. See, e.g., 5 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2470, at 402-03.
5 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Statutes'Domain, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983); see also Sunstein,
supra note 3, at 415-24.
6 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1017-19 (1989); see also Sunstein, supra note 3, at 424-28.
7 See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
527, 529 (1947) ("I should say that the troublesome phase of construction is the determination of
the extent to which extraneous documentation and external circumstances may be allowed to
infiltrate the text on the theory that they were part of it, written in ink discernible to the judicial
eye.").
8 See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 123 (2005); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal
Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 771 (2003).
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2006).
10 See, e.g, Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4-5
(2000) (outlining hypertextualism and pragmatic textualism as two schools of interpretation used
by the Federal Circuit); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?
An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1133-34 (2004)
(outlining two distinct methodologies in the Federal Circuit's claim construction jurisprudence).
11 See, e.g., Nard, supra note 10, at 4-5; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1170-71.12 See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim
Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 49, 53-54 (2005).
13 E.g., id at 54; Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim
Construction, 59 FLA. L. REv. 333, 336-37 (2007).
14 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
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making, using, offering to sell, or selling the patented invention. 15 These broad
rights last for twenty years 16 and include potentially broad remedies such as treble
damages, 17 attorney's fees, 18 and injunctive relief.19  In recent years, patent-
holders have attempted to use these broad remedies against Microsoft for the use
of minor patented software components in Microsoft Office,20 as well as in an
attempt to shut down the maker of the "Blackberry." 21 Getting claim construction
right is therefore of vital importance in patent law-the broader the claim, the
more powerful the patent.
This article's thesis is twofold. First, despite the Federal Circuit's
assertions to the contrary, its approach to claim construction resembles the
contract interpretation theory espoused by Samuel Williston: a model focused on
the plain meaning of the text of the patent document. Second, the Willistonian
approach is inapt; the court should instead construe claims according to Arthur
Corbin's theory of contract interpretation, which would look at the subjective
intent of the patentee and the patent examiner, provide a greater role for extrinsic
evidence, and address some of the problems that have arisen under the current
framework.22 Part I provides a background on claims, claim construction, and the
Federal Circuit's current jurisprudence, including how the court has explicitly
rejected a claim construction methodology based on contract law. Part II sets
forth Williston's method of contract interpretation and describes how the Federal
Circuit, despite its explicit rejection of the patent-contract analogy, implicitly
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor[e],
infringes the patent.").
15 See id; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) ("Every patent shall contain a short title of the
invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing
the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others
from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the United
States, products made by that process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.").
16 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
17 See id. § 284.
18 See id. § 285.
19 See id. § 283 ("The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured
by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable."); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (outlining equitable principles that a court should consider
when determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate).
20 See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Federal
Circuit affirmed a jury verdict of $25 million against Microsoft in the case. Id. at 1346. In
another recent case, a $1.52 billion verdict was reached against Microsoft, but this verdict was
later vacated. See John Markoff, Judge Sets Aside Record $1.5 Billion Verdict Against Microsoft
in MP3 Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at C3.
21 See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The district court
found against the maker of Blackberries and awarded over $53 million in damages as well as an
injunction against future infringement, id. at 1287, which was affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part,
vacated-in-part, and remanded on appeal. See id. at 1325-26.
22 This article argues in favor of applying Corbin's "substance" theory of interpretation to patent
claims. It takes no position on whether this interpretative theory is appropriate in other areas of
the law.
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applies this framework to patent claim construction. Finally, Part III discusses
Corbin's interpretative approach and shows how it provides a better framework
for the interpretation of patent claims by focusing on an inventor's intent,
expanding the quantity and quality of the evidentiary tools available for claim
construction, and minimizing the uncertainty created by the Federal Circuit's
current jurisprudence.
I. Background
A. The Role of Claims and the Significance of Claim Construction
Patents in the United States consist of a written description, drawings, and
claims.23  These various parts describe the invention being patented and teach
those skilled in that particular field how to make and use it. 4 The description
concludes with one or more claims, which "point[] out and distinctly claim[] the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."25 The inclusion of
claims in a patent, as well as their location within the patent document itself, is
statutorily mandated 6
But what exactly does a claim look like? Claims can exist in either
independent or dependent form. 2 7 An independent claim typically includes a
preamble that generally describes the elements or steps of a claimed combination,
a phrase such as "comprising" or "wherein the improvement comprises," and the28
elements which the applicant considers to be his or her invention. In contrast, a
dependent claim incorporates a prior independent claim and provides an
additional limitation. 9 Further, the Patent and Trademark Office, the agency
charged with making the initial determination on whether a patent should be
granted, requires claims to be drafted as a single sentence.
30
For example, a recently issued patent covered an "edible flying retrievable
animal toy."31 Essentially, the invention was a Frisbee-shaped dog toy made of
23 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). For an extensive discussion of the historical development of
claims, see 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.02 (2007).
24 See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
25 id.
26 See id. (stating that "[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more claims" (emphasis
added)). Thus, claims are mandatory and they must appear at the end of the patent document. See
id.
27 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("A claim may be written in independent or, if the nature of the case
admits, in dependent or multiple dependent form.").
21 E.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(e) (2008).
29 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("Subject to the following paragraph, a claim in dependent form shall
contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the
subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference
all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.").30 See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01(m) (8th ed., 6th rev. 2007) [hereinafter MPEP]; see also 1 R.
CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 4:95 (4th ed. 2007).
31 See U.S. Patent No. 6,725,809 (filed Feb. 26, 2003) (issued Apr. 27, 2004).
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rawhide. 32 An independent claim from the patent read as follows: "An edible
flying retrievable animal toy, comprising: a circular body member having a
convex upper surface and a concave lower surface wherein the body member is
formed of rawhide." 33 A dependent claim incorporated this independent claim,
along with an additional limitation: "The animal toy of claim 1 wherein the
rawhide is flavored. 34
Fig. 1. Drawing from Edible Flying Retrievable Animal Toy Patent
The claims of an issued patent are often significantly different from the
claims that were originally submitted to the PTO by the inventor. 35 After a patent
application is submitted to the PTO, that application is assigned to a patent
examiner, a "quasi-judicial official" who, as a general matter, represents the PTO
and the public during a patent's prosecution.36 As part of this process, the patent




35 See, e.g., 1 MOY, supra note 30, § 3:18 (noting that amendments to patent applications are
common during patent prosecution).
36 See W. Elec. Co., Inc. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 431-32 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing
numerous cases for the proposition that a patent examiner is a "quasi-judicial official"); see also
35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006) ("The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the application
and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the applicant is entitled
to a patent under the law, the Commissioner shall issue a patent therefor[e]."). See generally
Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 179,
182-84 (2007) (summarizing the patent prosecution process). For a more extensive discussion of
this process, see 4 CHISUM, supra note 23, § 11.03.
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order for the patent to satisfy the statutory requirements for validity.37 The
records of all of the PTO proceedings involving the patent application, including
representations made by the applicant about the scope of the patent's claims, are
called the patent's prosecution history.
38
Claims serve two similar purposes. First, claims "set[] the metes and
bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent system."39 In other
words, claims define a patent's scope and thus the subject matter over which the
patentee can claim a monopoly. 40  For example, returning to the "edible flying
retrievable animal toy,"41 the claims describe the scope of the invention-a
Frisbee-shaped retrievable toy consisting of rawhide would fall within the claim,
whereas a retrievable toy in the shape of a tennis ball would not.
Claims also serve a notice function.42 As the Federal Circuit noted, "one
of ordinary skill in the art should be able to read a patent, to discern which matter
is disclosed and discussed in the written description, and to recognize which
matter has been claimed. 4 3  Accordingly, an edible animal toy manufacturer
should be able to read the patent and know whether one of its planned products
17 See 35 U.S.C. § 131; In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The process of patent
prosecution is an interactive one."); John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary
Technologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L.
REv. 183, 184 (1999) (noting the development of claims following a "dialogue between applicant
and Patent Office examiner").
38 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that prosecution history
"contains the complete record of all the proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office,
including any express representations made by the applicant regarding the scope of the claims").
'9 Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir.1994); see
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 ("It is a 'bedrock principle' of patent law that 'the claims of a patent
define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude." (quoting Innova/Pure
Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004))); see also
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277 (1949), aff'd on r'hrg by 339
U.S. 605 (1950) ("We have frequently held that it is the claim which measures the grant to the
patentee."); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (stating that "[t]he claim is the
measure of [the patentee's] right to relief').40 See, e.g., Datamize L.L.C. v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(noting that "claims perform the fundamental function of delineating the scope of the invention");
see also Cotropia, supra note 12, at 65 ("The claim tells the public the patent's particular scope of
exclusivity by defining the patent grant's metes and bounds.").
41 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
42 See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1992) (noting the
"definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement"); Vitronics Corp.,
90 F.3d at 1583 ("In other words, competitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the
established rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee's claimed invention
and, thus, design around the claimed invention."); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948,
951 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting "the function of claims in putting competitors on notice of the scope
of the claimed invention").
43 PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int'l Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also
Cotropia, supra note 12, at 62 ("A patent claim seeks to inform the public of the subject matter
over which the patent provides exclusivity.").
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falls within the patent's scope. In light of these significant functions, as Judge
Giles Rich famously wrote, "the name of the game is the claim."
44
In order to accomplish these goals, however, the actual words of a claim
must be interpreted.45 Through claim interpretation, a court seeks to give a fixed
and definite meaning to the words of a claim, regardless of the context in which
the interpretation occurs.46 A patentee cannot argue for differing interpretations
of a claim in different situations.
47
The process of interpreting claims can occur in a variety of contexts by a
variety of actors. 48  For example, a business could interpret a claim when
developing new products or technologies.49  If the business's interpretation
indicated that its activity might infringe the patent, it may decide to design around
the patent or seek a license from the patentee.50  Notably, many commentators
dispute whether businesses actually interpret, or even look at, patents in
practice.
5 1
Arguably, the most important context in which claim interpretation occurs,
and the context on which this article focuses, is patent infringement litigation.
52
44 Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American Perspectives, 21
INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990).
45 See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 12, at 54 ("In a vacuum, claim terms are of little use. They must
be interpreted and given meaning so they can be used in a given context."); see also supra note 1
and accompanying text.
46 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV.
101, 103 (2005) (noting that "courts give claims a single meaning in any given case, engaging in
only one act of claim construction for any given patent").
47 See, e.g., id; see also White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1886) ("Some persons seem to
suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of wax, which may be turned and twisted in any
direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to make it include something more than,
or something different from, what its words express."); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.
Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that "claims must be construed the
same way for validity and for infringement").
48 See, e.g., Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1118 (noting that "claim construction is
undertaken by a variety of public and private actors").49 See Nard, supra note 10, at 4; see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d
1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("The ability to discern both what has been disclosed and what has
been claimed is the essence of public notice. It tells the public which products or processes would
infringe the patent and which would not."). When a patent is granted (or eighteen months after an
application is filed), the PTO is required to publish the application. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000
& Supp. V 2005).
'o See Nard, supra note 10, at 40-41; see also Slimfold Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932
F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Designing around patents is, in fact, one of the ways in which
the patent system works to the advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its
constitutional purpose."). For a more extensive discussion of design-around theory, see generally
Paul N. Katz & Robert R. Riddle, Designing Around a United States Patent, 45 S. TEx. L. REv.
647 (2004).
51 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REv. 19, 21.
52 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 46, at 101 ("One of the most significant aspects of patent litigation
is 'claim construction,' the process of defining the words of the claim in other, theoretically
clearer words.").
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An increasing number of patent infringement cases are filed each year.53 In most
of these cases, claim construction is the first inquiry.54 The ultimate goal for a
court when interpreting terms in a claim is to provide a fixed meaning which can
then be compared with the allegedly infringing device. 55 However, even though it
is only the first step, it is usually determinative. Shortly after a district court's
claim construction, infringement cases typically resolve via summary judgment or
56
settlement. As a result, "litigants usually spend significant resources disputing
the meaning of each claim term at issue in a suit."
57
53 From September 2007 to September 2008, almost three thousand patent infringement suits were
filed. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 205 tbl.C-1 1 (2009) [hereinafter 2008
ANNUAL REPORT]. Further, at the end of the same period, over 3600 suits remained pending. See
id. The number of these suits has steadily increased over the past twenty years. See, e.g., Jean 0.
Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms
Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45, 45 (2004) (noting the "very rapid growth in patent litigation
over the past [two] decades, during which the number of patent suits increased almost [ten]-fold");
see also Gauri Prakash-Canjels, Trends in Patent Cases, 41 IDEA 283, 284 (2001) (showing that
from 1990 to 2000, the total number of filed patent infringement cases increased by 111%).
54 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc);
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Abbott
Labs. v. Sandoz, 544 F.3d 1341, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("The first step in most infringement suits
is the procedure called 'claim construction,' where the scope of the claim is defined by the
court.").
51 See, e.g., Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("Courts construe
claim terms in order to assign a fixed, unambiguous, legally operative meaning to the claim.").
56 See Lemley, supra note 46, at 108 ("Claim construction is often outcome-determinative in
infringement cases; once the patent claims have been construed summary judgment for one side or
the other is quite common."); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 33.22
(2004) (noting that "many patent cases are resolved once the claim construction is decided, either
through summary judgment or settlement, with substantial savings in judicial time and resources
that would otherwise be spent in a lengthy, often complicated trial"); Patent Litigation Committee,
Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass'n, The Interpretation of Patent Claims, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 5 (2004)
[hereinafter Interpretation of Patent Claims] ("Given the great impact claim construction may
have on the outcome of a case, the court's construction of the claims of a patent may be case
dispositive or drastically affect the prospect of settlement."). But see Arti Rai, Engaging Facts
and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1035,
1059 (2003) (citing a 1999 survey indicating that only 29% of patent infringement cases settle
based on a trial court's claim construction). Indeed, a party's failure to settle or dismiss an
infringement suit following an adverse claim construction decision has caused some courts to
award attorney's fees to the opposing party. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C. v.
Power Distrib., Inc., No. 3:07CV167-HEH, 2008 WL 373639, at *2-3 (E.D. Va. Feb. 8, 2008)
(finding a case "exceptional" pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285 based on a party's "disturbing litigation
strategy" that unnecessarily prolonged litigation following an adverse claim construction ruling).57 Interpretation of Patent Claims, supra note 56, at 5; see also John M. Golden, Construing
Patent Claims According to Their "Interpretative Community": A Call for an Attorney-Plus-
Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 322 (2008) (noting that because so much is at
stake, claim construction is "one of the most contentious and difficult tasks of modem patent
law").
9 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 9
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B. The Federal Circuit's Current Claim Construction Jurisprudence
The primary jurisprudential foundations for the Federal Circuit's current
claim construction framework can be traced back to 1995, when the en banc court
in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. decided that judges, not juries, construe
patent claims. 58 As the Supreme Court stated when affirming this decision, "the
construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively
within the province of the court." 59  Because judges construe claims, claim
construction is reviewed on appeal without deference, using a de novo standard.6 °
When interpreting claim language, a court looks at the text of the claims
and gives terms their "ordinary and customary meaning." 61 The perspective used
is "the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the
patent application." 62  Thus, a court applies an objective standard when
ascertaining a claim's meaning.
63
One of the more hotly contested issues in the court's jurisprudence has
been the types of evidence that a judge may consider when construing claims.64
In 1996, the Federal Circuit attempted to address this issue in Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc. 65 In Vitronics, the court outlined a process for judges to use
when engaging in claim construction.66 The court began its analysis by noting
that when interpreting a disputed claim, the first inquiry is to examine the intrinsic
evidence of a patent, specifically the "words of the claims themselves." 67 Even
though words are given their "ordinary and customary meaning, a patentee may
choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their
ordinary meaning," provided that "the special definition ... is stated in the patent
specification or file history." 68 Next, a court can examine additional intrinsic
evidence, particularly the specification, which the court described as "the single
best guide to the meaning of a disputed term."
69
The Vitronics court went on to address the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence-i.e., "evidence which is external to the patent and file history, such as
expert testimony, inventor testimony, dictionaries, and technical treatises and
58 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
59 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
60 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(concluding that claim construction is a purely legal issue that is reviewed de novo).
61E.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
62 id.
63 See id.
64 See, e.g., Mullally, supra note 13, at 362-63.
65 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
66 1d. at 1582-83.
671d. at 1582 (noting that "intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the legally operative
meaning of disputed claim language").
68 Id. "File history" refers to the patent's prosecution history, which can also be considered. See
id. at 1582-83.
69 Id. at 1582.
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articles., 70 According to the court, if intrinsic evidence resolves any ambiguity in
the disputed claim term, "it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence." 7' Further,
extrinsic evidence "may be used only to help the court come to the proper
understanding of claims; it may not be used to vary or contradict the claim
language." 72 Thus, the Vitronics decision limited the use of extrinsic evidence for
purposes of claim construction.
Six years later, however, the Federal Circuit adopted a more flexible
approach to the role of extrinsic evidence, or at least certain types of extrinsic
evidence, in Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc. 73 In Texas Digital, the
court began by reaffirming that claim terms are interpreted in order to ascertain
their ordinary meaning to a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art
("PHOSITA").74  The court then outlined relevant precedent holding that
"dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises are particularly useful resources to
assist the court in determining the ordinary and customary meanings of claim
terms., 75 Part of the reason for this special role is that these sources are publicly
available and provide objective, reliable sources of information as to the
established meaning of claim terms.76
In order to adapt claim construction to account for the elevated role of
dictionaries and similar sources, the Texas Digital court offered a new process for
claim construction.77  First, the court emphasized that dictionaries could
appropriately be consulted at any point by a judge faced with construing the
claims of a patent.78 In fact, a dictionary definition was the presumed meaning of
a disputed claim term.79 After this initial use of a dictionary, the intrinsic record
could be consulted either to select the correct dictionary definition or to determine
whether the patentee had acted as his or her own lexicographer and provided a
different definition. 80 Intrinsic evidence could also reveal a disavowal of claim
scope. 81 Thus, Texas Digital reexamined the process outlined in Vitronics and
elevated the role of specific types of extrinsic evidence in claim construction.
In Phillips v. A WH Corp., an en banc opinion, the Federal Circuit
endeavored to resolve this conflicting precedent and provide guidance to lower
courts. 82 In outlining the appropriate interpretative framework, the court began by
70Id. at 1584.
71 1d. at 1583.
72Id. at 1584.
73 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002).74 Id. at 1202 ("The terms used in the claims bear a 'heavy presumption' that they mean what they
say and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in
the relevant art.").
75 id.
76 1d. at 1202-03.
77 See id. at 1203-04.
781Id. at 1203.
79 See id. at 1203-04.
80 See id.81Id. at 1204.
82 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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noting that the primary interpretative aid is intrinsic evidence. 83 Accordingly,
because claims are part of the specification, the court reaffirmed the principle
from Vitronics that the specification provides the "single best guide to the
meaning of a disputed term." 84  A court should therefore examine how the
disputed term is used in the context of the claim itself.85 Additional claims within
the same patent also provide a "valuable source[] of enlightenment as to the
meaning of a claim term," 86 as well as the patent's written description.
87
The court also reaffirmed that another relevant intrinsic source is the
patent's prosecution history. 88 Because this history "provides evidence of how
the PTO and the inventor understood the patent," as well as the fact that it was
"created by the patentee in attempting to explain and obtain the patent," it can
have relevance for purposes of claim construction. 89 However, the lack of clarity
and finality of this negotiation between the PTO and the patentee makes it "less
useful for claim construction purposes."
90
The court in Phillips also implicitly adopted the limited role for extrinsic
evidence outlined in Vitronics.91 Extrinsic evidence is essentially any evidence
that is not intrinsic. 92 According to the court, such evidence is "less reliable than
the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms."
93
Thus, the court rejected the process and elevated position of dictionaries outlined
in Texas Digital.
94
Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equipment, Inc. provides an example
of how the court applies this interpretative framework. 95  In Helmsderfer, the
patented invention was a vandalism-resistant baby diaper changing station.
96
Specifically, the patent provided for a wall-mounted station where the changing
table could fold against the wall when it was not in use.9 7 The claim at issue
83 See id. at 1314-17.
84Id. at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
85 Id. at 1314. For example, the use of a modifier or adjective with the disputed term limits the
breadth of that term's definition. Id. Specifically, in Phillips, the claim referred to "steel baffles,"
which the Federal Circuit noted "strongly implies that the term 'baffles' does not inherently mean
objects made of steel." Id.
86 Id. As the Federal Circuit noted, "[b]ecause claim terms are normally used consistently
throughout the patent, the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the
same term in other claims." Id.87 Id. at 1317 ("It is therefore entirely appropriate for a court, when conducting claim construction,




91 See id. at 1319 ("In sum, extrinsic evidence may be useful to the court, but it is unlikely to result
in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic
evidence.").92 See id. at 1317.
93 1d. at 1318.
94 See id. at 1320-23.
95 527 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
9 6 Id at 1380.
97 Id. Claim one of the patent stated:
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stated that when the table was folded against the wall, the top surface was
"partially hidden from view and the bottom surface is exposed for view." 98 The
dispute was whether the term "partially" included "completely."
99
In resolving this dispute, the court began by examining the patent's
intrinsic evidence.100 First, the court noted that the patentee's argument rested
solely on the premise that the plain meaning of "partially" included "completely,"
and not that it had provided a unique definition based on the written
description. 1 1 Next, the court noted that the specification never used the claim
language at issue and, accordingly, provided no guidance. 102  Since the parties
stipulated that the prosecution history did not give any insight either, the court
concluded that intrinsic evidence did not provide a clear meaning of "partially
hidden from view." 10 3  For that reason, the court could appropriately examine
extrinsic evidence, specifically, several dictionary definitions. 0 4 Based on these
sources, the court concluded that "the ordinary and customary meaning of the




In addition to the Phillips framework, the Federal Circuit has outlined
several "canons" of claim construction. 10 6 Courts use these canons when applying
various interpretative tools, but "no canon of construction is absolute in its
application." For example, courts will use a patent's written description to help
A wall-mounted station for changing the diapers of a baby comprising:
a support platform having top and bottom surfaces and opposing sides, the
support platform being hingedly fixable at one side with respect to a wall;
the support platform being movable between a closed position up against a wall
wherein the platform top surface is partially hidden from view and the bottom
surface is exposed for view and an opened position hinged away from a wall
wherein the support platform is disposed generally perpendicular to a wall and
the top surface is exposed for receiving a baby;
a generally flat protective panel, formed of a non-glass, abrasion-resistant
material, the platform bottom surface being configured for receiving said panel
such that said panel overlies at least a portion of the platform bottom surface and
covers the exposed bottom surface of the platform when the support platform is
in a closed position to create vandalism proof support platform for reducing the
effects of graffiti and abrasions on the platform and for improving the inner
decor of a facility in which the changing station is installed.
U.S. Patent No. 6,049,928 (filed Jan. 27, 1998) (issued Apr. 18, 2000) (emphasis added).
98 U.S. Patent No. 6,049,928.
99 See Helmsderfer, 527 F.3d at 1381-82.
1°° Id. at 1381.
101 Id
102 See id at 1381-82.
103 Id. at 1382 & n.2.
104Id. at 1382-83.
105 Id. at 1383; see also id. ("In this case there is only one ordinary meaning attributable to the
word 'partially' and this meaning does not include 'totally."').106 See, e.g., Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1341-48 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (outlining
common canons of claim construction utilized by the Federal Circuit); Cotropia, supra note 12, at
73-74 (describing the various canons of claim construction).
107 Renishaw P.L.C. v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see
also Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("All
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ascertain the meaning of a term in a claim, but will not use it to impose
restrictions on the claim's scope. 10 8 Further, the canon of claim differentiation
provides that each claim within a patent should be interpreted as having a
different meaning. 10 9 Other canons include construing claims to preserve their
validity110 and not construing a claim to exclude the preferred embodiment of an
invention.
111
C. Patents and Contracts
1. The Patent-Contract Analogy
Historically, patents have been compared to contracts, primarily because
the theoretical underpinnings of patent law coincide with the underlying
contractual concept of a bargain. In order for a contract to exist, a bargain is
generally required. 112 A bargain consists of "a manifestation of mutual assent to
the exchange and a consideration."1
13
This bargaining dynamic also exists in patent law. Congress's
constitutional power to create the patent system hinges on its ability to promote
progress in "Science and the useful Arts." 114  As a result, the Supreme Court
rules of construction must be understood in terms of the factual situations that produced them, and
applied in fidelity to their origins.").
108 See, e.g., Renishaw P.L.C., 158 F.3d at 1248 ("Renishaw, of course, alludes to a familiar pair of
claim construction canons: (a) one may not read a limitation into a claim from the written
description, but (b) one may look to the written description to define a term already in a claim
limitation, for a claim must be read in view of the specification of which it is a part. These two
rules lay out the general relationship between the claims and the written description.").
109 See, e.g., Ecolab, Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Under the
doctrine of claim differentiation, 'each claim in a patent is presumptively different in scope.' This
presumption is especially strong where 'there is a dispute over whether a limitation found in a
dependent claim should be read into an independent claim, and that limitation is the only
meaningful difference between the two claims."' (quoting Intermatic Inc. v. Lamson & Sessions
Co., 273 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) (internal citation omitted)).
110 See, e.g., Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 14 (1935) ("[I]f the claim were fairly susceptible to two
constructions, that should be adopted which will secure to the patentee his actual invention");
Modine Mfg. Co., 75 F.3d at 1557 ("When claims are amenable to more than one construction,
they should when reasonably possible be interpreted so as to preserve their validity.").
111 See, e.g., Primos, Inc. v. Hunter's Specialties, Inc., 451 F.3d 841, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("While
we are mindful that we cannot import limitations from the preferred embodiments into the claim,
we also should not normally interpret a claim term to exclude a preferred embodiment." (citing
Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
112 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1979). This general rule is subject
to exceptions. See id § 17(2). For example, a promise which reasonably induces reliance can be
binding, provided that "injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Id. § 90.
113 Id. § 17(1); see also id. § 3 ("A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a
promise for a performance or to exchange performances.").
114 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have the power... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.. ."); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) ("This qualified authority... is limited to the promotion of advances in the
'useful arts.' ... The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints
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noted, the modem patent system "represents a carefully crafted bargain," which is
designed to encourage the creation of new technology and ensure its disclosure to
the public. 115 An inventor receives a monopoly in his or her invention, in return
for the public receiving the benefits of the disclosure of information into the
public domain and the incentivizing of inventions generally. 116  Historically,
courts viewed this bargain as the basis for recognizing that a patent is a
contract. 1 17  Accordingly, some courts argued that principles of contract
interpretation should apply when construing patents. 118
An additional parallel exists in how a patent is obtained. During the
prosecution of a patent application, an examiner at the PTO, representing the
public, engages in a series of communications with the applicant. Often, this
imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without
regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby.... Innovation,
advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a
patent system which by constitutional command must 'promote the Progress of useful Arts."').
115 Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998).
116 See, e.g., Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 150-52 (1989); Scott Paper Co.
v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945); FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS OF OUR
PATENT SYSTEM 32 (MacMillan Co. 1925).
117 See, e.g., Fried. Krupp Aktien-Gesellschaft v. Midvale Steel Co., 191 F. 588, 594 (C.C.A.3d
1911) ("Tersely stated, an American patent is a written contract between an inventor and the
government.... The consideration given on the part of the inventor to the government is the
disclosure of his invention in such plain and full terms that any one skilled in the art to which it
appertains may practice it. The consideration on the part of the government given to the patentee
for such disclosure is a monopoly... of the invention disclosed to the extent of the claims allowed
in the patent."); Davis Airfoils v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 350, 352 (Ct. Cl. 1954) ("A patent is
a contract between the inventor and the public, the terms of which are formulated by the United
States Patent Office."); United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 73 F. Supp. 979, 981 (D. Del. 1947)
("A patent is a contract between an inventor and the government. The consideration which
supports the contract is the inventor's disclosure of his invention and the government's grant of an
exclusive monopoly for a stated period of time."). More recently, one commentator viewed
patents as unilateral, not bilateral, contracts. See Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the
Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 134-41 (2000). Viewing patents
substantively as contracts is currently foreclosed by statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (stating
that, as a general matter, "patents shall have the attributes of personal property").
118 See, e.g., Photo Elecs. Corp. v. England, 581 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The patent is a
contract between the government and the patentee. The accepted rules for construing contracts
should be consulted and applied."); Doble Eng'g Co. v. Leeds & Northrup Co., 134 F.2d 78, 84
(1st Cir. 1943) ("But the fact remains that patents, like contracts, are bilateral instruments, and this
common feature makes the rules for the construction of contracts applicable to them."); see also
Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 550 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1977) ("Since letters patent are
contracts, they should be construed with the interest of the parties in mind to give effect to their
legitimate expectations."); GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
USEFUL INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA xxxvi (1849) (noting that "a patent
should be construed as, what it really is in substance, namely, a contract or bargain between the
patentee and the public"); JOHN BARKER WAITE, PATENT LAW 271 (1920) (stating that when
interpreting patents, "[t]he ordinary rules for the construction of contracts apply").
119 See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006) ("The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the
application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the applicant
is entitled to a patent under the law, the Commissioner shall issue a patent therefor[e]."); see also
Mullally, supra note 13, at 346-47 (describing the patent examination process).
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occurs as part of an initial rejection of one or more claims from the patent
application. 20 When responding to this initial rejection, an applicant will either
submit arguments in support of the original claim or amend his or her claims in
order to address the examiner's concerns. 121 Undoubtedly, this process resembles
the negotiating and bargaining that routinely occurs with contracts. 
122
2. Rejection by the Federal Circuit
In Markman, however, the Federal Circuit explicitly rejected both the idea
of a patent as a contract and the idea that the interpretative principles of contract
law could apply to patent claim construction. This argument was not
unanimous, as several concurring and dissenting opinions disagreed with the
majority's analysis on this issue.
In reaching its conclusion, the Federal Circuit first noted that "[a] patent is
not [] a contract." 12 5 According to the court, "[o]nce a patent is issued, any
purported exchange of promises between the applicant and the [PTO] has been
fully executed." 126 Further, the court noted that the PTO has no discretion on
whether to issue a patent if the statutory requirements have been met, and the
patentee is unable to contract with anyone other than the government.
127
The court also outlined why differences between patents and contracts
made theories of contract interpretation irrelevant for purposes of claim
construction. 128 First, the court discussed how a patent infringement action differs
from a breach of contract action. 129 Specifically, an alleged infringer is "never a
party to the so-called 'contract' between the government and the inventor," 130 and
likely does not have personal knowledge of the process by which the patent was
obtained.' 31 Additionally, the court stated that unlike contract law, "[t]here is no
parol evidence rule in patent law,"'132 and that when construing claim terms in
120 See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
121 See id.
122 See Mullally, supra note 13, at 346 (describing the back and forth process of negotiation during
patent procurement as similar to a contract negotiation); Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence
Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 766 (1999) (noting that "the process whereby one
obtains a patent is comparable to a contract negotiation between the patent applicant and the PTO,
as representative of the public, including the applicant's competitors").
123 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 984-87 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
Notably, this analysis was not addressed by the Supreme Court in its decision affirming the
Federal Circuit. For an additional critique of the patent-contract analogy, see 1 MoY, supra note
30, § 4:53.124 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 998-1026.
12 51 d at 985 n.14.
126 id
127 id
128 See id at 985-87.
129 Id at 985.
13 0 id
131 Id at 987.
132 Id at 985; see also id ("Parol or other extrinsic evidence cannot add, subtract, or vary the
limitations of the claims.").
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patent cases, the inventor's subjective intent plays no role-whereas in contract
cases, the subjective intent of the parties is the primary focus. 133 Accordingly, the
court concluded that "[t]he more appropriate analogy for interpreting patent
claims is the statutory interpretation analogy."
134
II. Claim Construction and Williston's Theory of Contract
Interpretation
The Federal Circuit has expressly and strongly repudiated the patent-
contract analogy and the use of principles of contract interpretation for purposes
of claim construction. A closer examination of the process outlined by the court's
current claim construction jurisprudence, however, indicates that in reality the
court is implicitly applying the interpretative principles of contract law. More
specifically, the Federal Circuit applies Professor Samuel Williston's theory,
which relies on the plain meaning of language contained in the document. This
theory, which the court explicitly adopts in other substantive areas of its
jurisprudence, has had significant implications for claim construction and patent
law generally.
A. Williston's Approach to Contract Interpretation
Williston espoused a view of contract interpretation that focused on the
text of the document. Specifically, he argued that interpretation should look to
the "plain, common, or normal meaning of language."' 135 Although a court's
ultimate goal is to ascertain the intent of the parties, "it is not the real intent but
the intent expressed or apparent in the writing which is sought." 36 Thus, when
interpreting a contract, "it is not primarily the intention of the parties which the
court is seeking, but the meaning of the words at the time and place when they
were used.
137
133 See id. at 985-86.
134Id. at 987.
135 See 11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:3 (4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS].
136 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 610, at 1177 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1921)
[hereinafter WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS].137Id. § 613, at 1186; see also Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent in Contracts, 14 ILL. L. REV. 85,
89 (1919) ("No evidence or admission will alter the application of the rule that the writing, not the
intent of the parties, even though otherwise expressed, defines the terms of the contract.");
Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand, J.) ("A contract has,
strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual intent of the parties.").
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Under Williston's approach, interpretation is a two-step process. 138 First,
a court must decide whether the language of the contract is ambiguous. 3 9 A word
or phrase is ambiguous if a "genuine doubt appears as to its meaning."' 140 When
making this determination, "the court begins with its plain language, construed in
harmony with the plain and generally accepted meaning of the words used."
141
This process is apurely objective inquiry and the subjective intent of the parties is
not considered. 142
If a contract is unambiguous, the court effectuates the words as written.
143
In that scenario, Williston tells us, "the court determines the contract's meaning
from the language alone, without reference to extrinsic facts or aids, and without
resort to the rules of construction."' 144  While a court may admit extrinsic
evidence, "whatever the extrinsic evidence might show, it [can] not change the
intent of the parties as expressed in the writing."
145
If a contract is ambiguous, the court is faced with a question as to the
meaning of the term. 146 Accordingly, the fact-finder must interpret the meaning
of the term in light of the intent of the parties. 147 For example, a fact-finder must
look to the purpose of the contract as a whole, established rules of construction,
and extrinsic evidence.
148
Williston's views were incorporated into the Restatement (First) of
Contracts, for which he was the reporter. 149 In the case of an integrated writing,
the First Restatement gave words, "except where it produces an ambiguous
result," a meaning consistent to that "a reasonably intelligent person acquainted
with all operative usages and knowing all the circumstances prior to and
118 See E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 959 (1967)
("Under the older and more restrictive [approach], parol evidence may only be used for thepurpose of interpretation where the language in the writing is 'ambiguous.' The decision to admit
parol evidence, that is, consists of two steps: first, one decides whether the language is ambiguous;
second, if it is ambiguous, then one admits parol evidence only for the purpose of clearing up that
ambiguity. This is the view adopted both by Williston and by the Restatement of Contracts.").
139 See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 135, § 30:4 ("It is a generally accepted proposition
that where the terms of a writing are plain and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation or
construction, since the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty...
• However,... the interpretation of a contract requires an initial determination of whether the
contract is ambiguous..1a° Id § 30:4; id. § 31:4.
141 Id § 30:5.
142 Id. § 30:4; see also WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS, supra note 136, § 611 (stating that "the
so-called parol evidence rule ... precludes the parties not only from applying a standard which is
based on their individual mental understanding but also one based on their individual oral
agreement").141 See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 13 5, § 3 0:6.
144 id.





149 See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and lts
Implications for New Textualist Statutory Construction, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 201-02 (1998).
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contemporaneous with the making of the integration" would give it.150  Thus,
"[t]he objective viewpoint of a third person is taken,"'151 and "the terms of the
writing are conclusive."' 152  Although "evidence of surroundings is always
admissible," that evidence only affects a court's analysis if reformation of the
contract is necessary.153
B. The Federal Circuit's Adoption of Williston's Approach in Contract Cases
As previously outlined, the Federal Circuit has explicitly rejected the use
of any theory of contract interpretation for purposes of claim construction.
154
Despite this rejection, examining the approach taken by the court in non-patent
cases involving contract interpretation remains relevant as an indicator of the
court's overall interpretative philosophy. Because interpretative philosophies
often remain consistent between different areas of the law,155 the adoption of
Williston's interpretative theory in contract cases would provide insight into how
the Federal Circuit considers interpretative questions in patent law.
In addition to patents, the Federal Circuit retains appellate jurisdiction
over many disputes involving government contracts. 156 As a result, it frequently
faces problems of contract interpretation. 157  In these government contract
decisions, the Federal Circuit has developed a jurisprudence that "by-in-large...
follows the [] Williston approach, mandating that in general, trial courts should
not admit extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of contractual terms and
provisions."' 158 The court's decision to apply this approach runs contrary to the
majority of jurisdictions within the United States, which reject the Willistonian
method of contract interpretation. 
159
Specifically, the Federal Circuit has adopted Williston's general
interpretative philosophy of seeking the "plain meaning" of the text of a
150 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932).
151 Id. § 230 cmt. a.
152 Id § 230 cmt. b.
153 Id. § 235 cmt. f; see also id § 235 cmt. g ("Even if a contract is not integrated, words when
explicit ordinarily have a higher probative value than accompanying circumstances can have.").
154 See supra Part I.C.2.
155 See generally Christopher H. Schroeder, Foreword, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2004)
(discussing competing ideologies influencing American jurisprudence).
156 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a), (b) (2000); 41 U.S.C. § 607(g)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (outlining the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims,
over which the Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction).15 7 See, e.g., Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Interpretation Disputes: Finding an Ambiguity, 4
NASH & CIBINIc REP. 25, Apr. 1990, at 58 ("The most frequently litigated issue in Government
contracting is probably the correct interpretation of contract language.").
158 Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 696, 707 (2007). See generally
W. Stanfield Johnson, Interpreting Government Contracts: Plain Meaning Precludes Extrinsic
Evidence and Controls at the Federal Circuit, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 635 (2005) (discussing the
Federal Circuit's application of Willistonian principles in government contract cases generally).
159 See Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., 75 Fed. Cl. at 707.
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contract. 160  The court has held that "[w]hen the contractual language is
unambiguous on its face, our inquiry ends and the plain language of the
Agreement controls."'161 Similarly, the court has adopted Williston's view that the
subjective intent of the parties, if relevant at all, is subordinate to the text of the
document. 162  Thus, "extrinsic evidence may not be used to interpret an
unambiguous contract provision."' 163 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit agrees with
Williston's theory of interpretation and has adopted it in government contract
cases.
C. The Federal Circuit's Implicit Application of Williston 's Interpretative
Approach to Patent Claim Construction
The Federal Circuit's contract jurisprudence indicates that members of the
court have accepted Willistonian interpretative principles. The potential therefore
exists for this engrained interpretative philosophy to bleed over into different
substantive areas of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence. 164  Indeed, despite its
explicit rejection of the application of principles of contract interpretation to
patent claim construction in Markman,165 the Federal Circuit has implicitly
adopted Williston's philosophy in its claim construction jurisprudence.
Initially, like Williston, the Federal Circuit has developed an interpretative
philosophy in patent claim construction cases centering on the "plain and ordinary
meaning" of words. 166  Specifically, the court has instructed that, when
160 See, e.g., Ace Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 499 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("In
contract interpretation, the plain meaning of the contract's text controls unless it is apparent that
some other meaning was intended and mutually understood.").
161 Coast Fed. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1035, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
162 See, e.g., R.B. Wright Constr. Co. v. United States, 919 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("Neither a contractor's belief nor contrary customary practice however, can make an
unambiguous contract provision ambiguous, or justify a departure from its terms.").
163 Teg-Paradigm Environ., Inc. v. United States, 465 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also
Coast Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 323 F.3d at 1040 ("If the 'provisions are clear and unambiguous, they
must be given their plain and ordinary meaning,' and we may not resort to extrinsic evidence to
interpret them." (internal citation omitted) (quoting Landmark Land Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp., 256 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).
164 See Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 696, 708 (2007) (discussing
how the Federal Circuit's statutory construction methodology has generally been incorporated into
its contract jurisprudence); see also Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana
Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Dyk, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-
part) ("Patent law is not an island separated from the main body of American jurisprudence.").
See generally Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical
Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1465-69 (1998) (discussing the impact of
ideology on judicial decision-making).
165 See supra Part I.C.2.
166 E.g., N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 215 F.3d 1281, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The
plain and ordinary meaning of claim language controls, unless that meaning renders the claim
unclear or is overcome by a special definition that appears in the intrinsic record with reasonable
clarity and precision."); see also DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., 537 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (stating that "absent contravening evidence from the specification or prosecution history,
plain and unambiguous claim language controls the construction analysis"). See generally
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conducting claim construction, a district court must give claim terms their
ordinary and plain meaning to a PHOSITA at the time of the invention.167 As a
result, "the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with
the actual words of the claim."' 168  Indeed, the Federal Circuit has previously
rejected attempts by patentees to use extrinsic evidence to expand the scope of a
patent beyond what the intrinsic evidence would support. 1
69
Because the PHOSITA standard is an objective inquiry, 170 the Federal
Circuit has concluded that the subjective intent of the inventor and the patent
examiner do not affect how a claim is construed. 17 1 First, the court has generally
limited, if not eliminated, the role that the subjective intent of an inventor plays in
the claim construction process, except to the extent that this intent is evidenced in
the patent's intrinsic record. 172  For example, in Markman, the Federal Circuit
stated that "[t]he subjective intent of the inventor when he used a particular term
is of little or no probative weight in determining the scope of the claim (except as
Thomas, supra note 8, at 792-96 (discussing how the Federal Circuit has become increasingly
formalistic).
167 See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
("It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose eyes the claims are
construed. Such person is deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with an
understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have knowledge of any special meaning and
usage in the field. The inventor's words that are used to describe the invention-the inventor's
lexicography-must be understood and interpreted by the court as they would be understood and
interpreted by a person in that field of technology.").
16' E.g., Renishaw P.L.C. v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
see also Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(noting that "there must be a textual reference in the actual language of the claim with which to
associate a proffered claim construction").
169 See, e.g., Astrazeneca AB, Aktiebolaget Hassle, KBI-E, Inc. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d
1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that even though the parties agreed that the extrinsic meaning
of a disputed claim term was broad, "[t]he intrinsic evidence ... clearly binds [the patentee] to a
narrower defmition... than the extrinsic evidence would support").
170 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(noting that "the inquiry into the meaning of claim terms is an objective one").
171 See, e.g., Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
("Thus, Superior's suggestion that we compare claim scope by considering what was 'intended'
by the parties, rather than by construing the claims for what they actually recite, is completely
without merit.").
172 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc);
see also Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("We hold
that claim terms take on their ordinary and accustomed meanings unless the patentee demonstrated
an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by redefining the
term or by characterizing the invention in the intrinsic record using words or expressions of
manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope."); Intellicall, Inc.
v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Thus, where a disputed term would
be understood to have its ordinary meaning by one of skill in the art from the patent and its
history, extrinsic evidence that the inventor may have subjectively intended a different meaning
does not preclude summary judgment.").
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documented in the prosecution history).' 73 As the court indicated, an exception
to this rule is if an inventor's intent is evident from intrinsic evidence. 174 Indeed,
it is well-established that patentees are free to be their own lexicographers and
define terms within the patent itself.175 Otherwise, evidence of subjective intent,
such as inventor testimony, "cannot be relied on to change the meaning of the
claims."' 176 This limitation on subjective intent is linked to the notice function of
claims. 177
The Federal Circuit has also rejected the use of the patent examiner's
understanding of a claim term as an interpretative tool.178 The court has noted,
however, that a patent examiner's statements "may be evidence of how one of
skill in the art understood the term at the time the application was filed."
179
Additionally, there is an exception for when an examiner's statements merely
repeat arguments presented by the patentee. 18  Besides these limited purposes, as
a general matter, an examiner's statements regarding his or her interpretation of a
claim, even if the patentee does not respond or refute that interpretation, cannot
assist in construing claims in a subsequent infringement case.
181
173 Markman, 52 F.3d at 985; see also id ("No inquiry as to the subjective intent of the applicant
or PTO is appropriate or even possible in the context of a patent infringement suit.").
174 See, e.g., id
175 See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316; Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Although words in a claim are generally given their ordinary and
customary meaning, a patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner
other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition of the term is clearly stated in
the patent specification or file history.").176 Markman, 52 F.3d at 983.
177 See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583; see also Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1145 (Fed. Cir.
2005) ("[I]n the absence of something in the written description and/or prosecution history to
provide explicit or implicit notice to the public-i.e., those of ordinary skill in the art-that the
inventor intended a disputed term to cover more than the ordinary and customary meaning
revealed by the context of the intrinsic record, it is improper to read the term to encompass a
broader definition simply because it may be found in a dictionary, treatise, or other extrinsic
source.").
178 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258,
1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that "the statements of an examiner will not necessarily limit a
claim"); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (same);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(en banc) (disregarding limiting statements made by an examiner for purposes of claim
construction when the limitations were not found in the claim language); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S.
Surgical Corp., 102 F. Supp. 2d 199, 217 (D. Del. 2000) ("The court recognizes that the Federal
Circuit has cautioned against reading examiners' statements into the scope of claims.").
179 Salazar v. Procter & Gamble Co., 414 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
180 See id. at 1346-47; ACCO Brands, Inc. v. Micro Sec. Devices, Inc. 346 F.3d 1075, 1079 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
181 See Salazar, 414 F.3d at 1347 (concluding that "an applicant's silence regarding [a patent
examiner's] statements does not preclude the applicant from taking a position contrary to the
examiner's statements when the claim terms are construed during litigation"); 3M Innovative
Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("An applicant's
silence in response to an examiner's characterization of a claim does not reflect the applicant's
clear and unmistakable acquiescence to that characterization if the claim is eventually allowed on
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Similarly, the Federal Circuit has restricted the role of extrinsic evidence
in claim construction. 182 Although a court may use extrinsic evidence, the Federal
Circuit has urged caution in relying upon it when construing a claim. 183 This rule
is reminiscent of Williston's belief that a court could listen to extrinsic evidence,
but could not admit it for purposes of interpretation. 1
84
Additionally, the guidelines provided by the Federal Circuit as to how a
court should go about the claim construction process are remarkably similar to the
interpretative process described by Williston for contract interpretation. As
outlined in Vitronics, when interpreting a disputed claim term, the first inquiry is
to examine the intrinsic evidence of a patent.' 85 If the plain and ordinary meaning
is evident, the analysis ends there. 186 If an ambiguity exists, however, a court can
examine extrinsic evidence to resolve that ambiguity. 187 In the absence of any
ambiguity, however, relying on extrinsic evidence is improper.1 88 If an ambiguity
grounds unrelated to the examiner's unrebutted characterization."); Schwing GmbH v. Putzmeister
Aktiengesellschaft, 305 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Although prosecution history can be a
useful tool for interpreting claim terms, it cannot be used to limit the scope of a claim unless the
applicant took a position before the PTO that would lead a competitor to believe that the applicant
had disavowed coverage of the relevant subject matter." (emphasis added)); see also Prima Tek II,
L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("We note that drawing
inferences of the meaning of claim terms from an examiner's silence is not a proper basis on
which to construe a patent claim.")
182 See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 525 F.3d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("In
determining the meaning of a disputed claim limitation, we look primarily to the intrinsic evidence
including the claim language, written description, and prosecution history."); Dow Chem. Co. v.
Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that a court may turn to
extrinsic evidence only in the "rare circumstance that the court is unable to determine the meaning
of the asserted claims after assessing the intrinsic evidence"). Notably, any theory of contract
interpretation would consider a patent's prosecution history to be extrinsic evidence. See, e.g.,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 597 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "extrinsic evidence" as "[e]vidence
relating to a contract but not appearing on the face of the contract because it comes from other
sources, such as statements between the parties or the circumstances surrounding the agreement").
183 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19 (outlining why extrinsic evidence is "less reliable" and how
it is "unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope"); see also Pitney Bowes,
Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Certainly, there are no
prohibitions in Vitronics on courts hearing evidence from experts. Rather, Vitronics merely
warned courts not to rely on extrinsic evidence in claim construction to contradict the meaning of
claims discernible from thoughtful examination of the claims, the written description, and the
prosecution history-the intrinsic evidence."); Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek
Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Use of expert testimony to explain an invention may be
useful. But reliance on extrinsic evidence to interpret claims is proper only when the claim
language remains genuinely ambiguous after consideration of the intrinsic evidence ......
(emphasis added)).
"' See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 135, § 30:6.
185 See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
186 See id at 1583.
187 See id But see Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) ("It is not ambiguity in the document that creates the need for extrinsic evidence but rather
unfamiliarity of the court with the terminology of the art to which the patent is addressed.").
188 See Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583 ("In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence
alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such circumstances, it is improper to
rely on extrinsic evidence.").
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exists, then the court may rely upon extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning
of the disputed term. 
189
One example of how the court applies this approach is the case of Chef
America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc. 190 In Chef America, the patent at issue
involved a process of making dough products.19' The disputed claim language
was "heating the resulting batter-coated dough to a temperature in the range of
about 4000 F. to 8500 F." 192 The Federal Circuit was asked to decide whether this
language required the dough itself to be heated to the listed temperature, or if this
range referred to the temperature of the oven. 193
The court began by noting that the claim language itself consisted of
"ordinary, simple English words whose meaning is clear and unquestionable."' 194
Accordingly, the court stated, "[t]hey mean exactly what they say. The dough is
to be heated to the specified temperature." 195 However, the problem with this
conclusion was that heating the dough to that temperature would cause it to be
"burned to a crisp," or, as one of the attorneys arguing the case stated, "something
that ... resembles a charcoal briquet[te]. ' '196 Yet, despite this result, the court
stated that it would "construe the claim as written, not as the patentees wish they
had written it" in light of the claim's unambiguous language. 1
97
This result typifies the Federal Circuit's Willistonian interpretative
methodology. Like Williston, the court made an initial determination of whether
the language of the claim was ambiguous. 198 Since the court did not find the
required ambiguity, it declined to examine any extrinsic evidence, despite the fact
that this analysis would have effectuated the intent of the patentee by allowing the
patented process to perform its intended function. 199 Thus, this case illustrates the
text-centric approach currently used by the Federal Circuit.
Despite the sweeping statements of some commentators, 200 the continuing
vitality of the Vitronics framework underscores the Federal Circuit's unstated
189 See id.
190 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
191 Id. at 1372.
9ijd at 1371.
193 Id. at 1371-72. Essentially, this decision consisted of determining whether the dough should
be heated to the specified temperature or at the specified temperature. See id. at 1373-74.
194Id at 1373.
195 Id. (emphasis added).
196 id.
197 Id at 1374.
198 See supra note 139.199 See id. at 1375 ("To the contrary [the patentees] argue only that 'to' should be construed to
mean 'at' because otherwise the patented process could not perform the function the patentees
intended. As we have noted, however, we have repeatedly declined to rewrite unambiguous patent
claim language for that reason.").
200 See, e.g., Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., It's Patent that "Plain Meaning" Dictionary Definitions
Shouldn't Dictate: What Phillips Portends for Contract Interpretation, 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 91, 91
(2006) ("In Phillips, the Federal Circuit basically adopted, for its patent construction cases, the
interpretation principles for contracts set out in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.").
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devotion to Willistonian interpretative methods. 20 1 In Phillips, the court remarked
that "[t]he sequence of steps used by the judge in consulting various sources is not
important" and that "there is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim
construction. " 202 However, the court also described the statements in Vitronics as
"attempt[ing] to explain why, in general, certain types of evidence are more
valuable than others." 20 3 Accordingly, the court "adhere[d]" and "reaffirm [ed]"
the claim construction approach outlined in Vitronics and similar cases.20 4  If
anything, the court's rejection of Texas Digital served to further solidify the claim
construction process articulated in Vitronics. 2 5 Thus, Vitronics, and its implicit
adoption of Williston's method of contract interpretation, remains intact following
Phillips. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Phillips did not have a
significant practical effect on district court decision-making.
20 6
Moreover, post-Phillips decisions have only further entrenched this
interpretative philosophy. For example, in a recent case, the Federal Circuit
reaffirmed that a district court may only "look to extrinsic evidence so long as the
extrinsic evidence does not contradict the meaning otherwise apparent from the
intrinsic record., 20 7 Another case held that inventor testimony as to subjective
intent is irrelevant for purposes of claim construction. 20 8  Thus, the Federal
Circuit's implicit adoption of Williston's model of contract interpretation
continues in the post-Phillips era.
D. Weaknesses/Critiques of Williston 's Approach and the Federal Circuit's
Claim Construction Jurisprudence
The Federal Circuit's claim construction jurisprudence has another
similarity to Williston's theory of contract interpretation-both have been subject
to many of the same critiques by scholars and commentators.
Initially, both interpretative regimes have been criticized for ignoring the
fact that words are inherently ambiguous. Similar to concerns noted by critics of
Williston, a standard focused on determining an amorphous objective meaning of209
words ignores the reality that words cannot have an objective, set meaning. As
201 See, e.g., Golden, supra note 57, at 325 ("Aside from rejecting such extreme excursions in
dictionary-driven literalism, however, Phillips generally reaffirmed existing precedent.").




206 See, e.g., Eric W. Hagen, No Big Change in Claim Construction Since Phillips: In Hundreds of
Decisions in Past Year, Case Has Had Only A Small Ripple Effect, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 15, 2006, at
S4.
207 Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., 527 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
208 See Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Wright Medical Tech., Inc., 540 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2008) ("We hold that inventor testimony as to the inventor's subjective intent is irrelevant to the
issue of claim construction.").
209 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory ofLegal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417,
417 (1898) ("It is not true (and I know of no reason why theory should disagree with the facts) a
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a result, a restrictive process unduly favors a judge's view of how "reasonable"
contracts should look and what a "reasonable" meaning would be.210 Indeed, "an
identical set of words can be plain and clear to some judges and ambiguous to
other judges (who are equally reasonable).",211 Thus, vagaries and buzzwords
such as "ambiguity" can provide judges with room to maneuver to effectuate a
desired outcome.2 12  Further, even when a judge determines that disputed
language is "plain and clear," that judge is using his or her own background (i.e.,
extrinsic evidence), to reach that conclusion.2 13
This problem is only exacerbated by the nature of patents and patent
claims.2 14 As one court pointed out, "[t]he very nature of words would make a
clear and unambiguous claim a rare occurrence." 215  In the realm of patents,
claims are attempting to describe a physical invention, and "[t]his conversion of
machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily
filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it."
216
These difficulties demonstrate the inherent problems with relying upon a text-
centered approach to claim construction and weighing intrinsic evidence too
highly.
given word or even a given collocation of words has one meaning and no other. A word generally
has several meanings, even in the dictionary.").
210 See Ross & Tranen, supra note 149, at 203.
211 Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q.
161, 183 (1964).
212 See Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time is
RipeforA Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 215-16 (2001);
see also Farnsworth, supra note 138, at 965; Frankfurter, supra note 7, at 529 (noting the potential
for "a judge to use words as 'empty vessels into which he can pour anything he will"').
211 See Corbin, supra note 211, at 162 & n.2.
214 See, e.g., William R. Hubbard, Efficient Definition and Communication of Patent Rights: The
Importance of Ex Post Delineation, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 327, 345
(2009) (noting that "the problems stemming from indeterminacies of language are magnified with
patents").
215 Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew
Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Claim interpretation is not always an exact
science, and it is not unusual for parties to offer competing definitions of even the simplest claim
language."); see also Topliffv. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892) ("The specification and claims
of a patent, particularly if the invention be at all complicated, constitute one of the most difficult
legal instruments to draw with accuracy ... ."); Kenneth D. Bassinger, Allocating Linguistic
Uncertainty in Patent Claims: The Proper Role of Prosecution History Estoppel, 49 LoY. L. REV.
339, 340 (2003) ("The subtle nuances of inventive genius are not readily described by the often
strict confines imposed by language. In trying to draft the text of a patent to precisely capture the
essence of the inventive subject matter, a patent attorney faces many choices in selecting the
proper words to describe the often abstract nature of invention.").216 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) (quoting
Autogiro Co., 384 F.2d at 397); PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The courts have recognized, particularly in fields of new and evolving
knowledge, that the claims can be no more precise than the knowledge in the field permits."); see
also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 882, 928 (2007) (noting that "reducing a technological concept to words is a chancy thing; the
available terminology may fail to capture the true nature of the innovation").
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The current claim construction jurisprudence is also problematic because
of the perspective that judges use to interpret disputed claim terms.217  By its
nature, the PHOSITA standard requires judges to give a claim term the meaning it
would have to a hypothetical third party at the time of the invention.218 Thus, it
requires judges to determine who a relevant PHOSITA would be, as well as that
person's background, experience, and knowledge. 219  This inquiry is difficult
since a PHOSITA varies according to the technology at issue.220  Further
fictionalizing the inquiry, a PHOSITA is presumed to know all relevant prior art,
a presumption that rarely, if ever, occurs in real life.22'
The PHOSITA standard also presents difficulties of hindsight bias.
222
When attempting to go back in time and look at how an imaginary PHOSITA
would have interpreted a claim term, it is easy for a judge to give meaning to a
term based on the current state of technology.22 3  As a result, judges will
frequently overestimate the level of skill in the art.224 Indeed, the Federal Circuit
has recognized this problem in other contexts and made an effort to limit its
217 See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 214, at 345. For a discussion of the issues created by utilizing
the PHOSITA standard in other contexts, see generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent
Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002), and Michael H. Davis, Patent
Politics, 56 S.C. L. REv. 337 (2004).
218 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(noting that a claim term means "what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention
would have understood the term to mean"); Douglas R. Nemec & Emily J. Zelenock, Rethinking
the Role of the Written Description Requirement in Claim Construction: Whatever Happened to
"Possession is Nine-Tenths of the Law?," 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 357, 361 (2007) ("Under
current canons of claim construction, the analysis focuses on the so-called 'ordinary meaning' of a
patent claim term to a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, rather than what the patentee
actually conceived, reduced to practice, and disclosed to the public.").
219 See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("Claim interpretation requires the court to ascertain the meaning of the claim to one of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of invention. This task requires the court to place the claim language in
its proper technological and temporal context."). In the obviousness context, the Federal Circuit
has outlined several factors for courts to consider. See Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713
F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
220 See Mullally, supra note 13, at 351-52; Lemley, supra note 46, at 102 ("Both the knowledge of
the PHOSITA in a particular field and the meaning of particular terms to that PHOSITA will
frequently change over time.").
221 See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
("The person of ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be aware of all the
pertinent prior art."); see also In re Application of Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966)
("We think the proper way to apply the [35 U.S.C. §]103 obviousness test to a case like this is to
first picture the inventor as working in his shop with the prior art references-which he is
presumed to know-hanging on the walls around him.").222 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 217, at 1198-99; Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious:
Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1391, 1440-41 (2006) (noting how hindsight bias impacts claim construction). See
generally Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 799-805 (2001)
(discussing the problem of hindsight bias among the federal judiciary more generally).
221 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 217, at 1198-99.
224Id. at 1199.
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effect.225  Such an effort has not been made, however, in the area of claim
construction.
On top of all of these challenges, a court must also familiarize itself with
the underlying technology at issue.226 Judges are selected for the bench because
of their expertise in the law generally, not because of their technical
background.227  Thus, this lack of background makes the current claim
construction regime even more difficult to apply by district court judges. 228 In
contrast, many Federal Circuit judges do have a technological background.229
When combined with the temporal requirement, a court is not only faced with the
difficulty of determining the skill level of a PHOSITA in a particular field, but
also the history of that particular field, a notoriously difficult process. 23  Further,
all of these challenges are exacerbated by the fact that, unlike juries, judges
typically must provide written opinions explaining their decisions. 2
In light of these inherent difficulties, it should come as no surprise that
courts often disagree as to how a claim term should be defined. Indeed, the
225 Id at 1198-99 ("The Federal Circuit has repeatedly recognized the problem of hindsight bias in
its obviousness jurisprudence, and has built rules designed to cope with it there, but hindsight bias
risks infecting the PHOSITA analysis in enablement and claim scope as well.").
226 E.g., id. at 1197; Rai, supra note 56, at 1068-69. See generally S. Jay Plager, Challenges for
Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-First Century: Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 69 (discussing the challenges that patent litigation creates for trial judges).
2 2 7 See, e.g., Judge James F. Holderman, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the United States,
2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 5 ("United States district court judges are appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, but typically not for their prowess in patent litigation.");
Rai, supra note 56, at 1046-47 ("Because the typical judge is not likely to be a person of ordinary
skill in the relevant scientific or technological art, she is not likely to be endowed with the
appropriate technical knowledge. As a consequence, even after examining a claim term in light of
the accompanying specification (or, more generally, in light of any of the applicable canons of
claim construction) she might still find the term difficult to understand.").
221 See Holderman, supra note 227, at 5-6; Mullally, supra note 13, at 365; see also ROBERT L.
HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 6.1 (8th ed. 2007) (noting that "a judge is not
usually a person conversant in the particular technical art involved and is not the hypothetical
person skilled in the art to whom a patent is addressed"). See generally Blonder-Tongue Labs.,
Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331 -32 (1971) ("We are also aware that some courts
have frankly stated that patent litigation can present issues so complex that legal minds, without
appropriate grounding in science and technology, may have difficulty in reaching decision.").
229 Judges Gajarsa, Linn, Lourie, Moore, and Newman have extensive scientific backgrounds. See
Federal Circuit - Judicial Biographies, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judgbios.html (last visited
May 15, 2009). See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The
Federal Circuit Comes ofAge, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 765, 797-800 (2008) (discussing how the
backgrounds of Federal Circuit judges differ from judges on other courts). However, as some
commentators have pointed out, even possessing scientific prowess is not necessarily beneficial in
patent cases, since technology rapidly changes and a judge's expertise may not relate to all of the
potential technical areas that patents can cover. See, e.g., Robin Feldman, Plain Language
Patents, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 289, 290-91 (2009).
230 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 217, at 1198 ("So courts trying to determine the level of skill
in the art must learn not just science, but the history of that science. Courts and expert witnesses
must shut out of their minds intervening developments in the field. This is notoriously hard to
do.").
231 See, e.g., Plager, supra note 226, at 72.
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Federal Circuit itself has been heavily divided over the results in Markman,
232Cybor, and Phillips. More recently, a denial of en banc review prompted sharp
dissents from several judges.233  Scholars have outlined this division as a
philosophical one, with judges split over, among other things, how formalistic
claim construction should be.234 As a result, as one empirical study concluded,
"[c]laim construction analysis at the Federal Circuit is clearly affected by the
composition of the panel that hears and decides the case."
235
Because of this disagreement, certainty in claim construction cases is often
elusive, if not illusory.2 3 6 Several empirical studies suggest that the reversal rate
of district court claim construction rulings is abnormally high.237 Accordingly, a
party defeated at trial often seeks the benefit of a do-over at the Federal Circuit
under a de novo standard of review.238 Thus, a significant percentage of patent
cases are appealed, with claim construction usually being an issue.239  Judges
themselves often write about their frustrations with the lack of certainty in their
claim construction rulings.240 This unrest is indicative of the flaws of the Federal
Circuit's current claim construction jurisprudence.
232 See supra note 10.
233 See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (order
denying rehearing en banc).
234 See supra note 10.
235 Polk & Petherbridge, supra note 10, at 1171.
236 See, e.g., Nard, supra note 10, at 82.
237 See, e.g., Bender, supra note 212, at 207 (finding a reversal rate of 40% for claim
construction); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1143 (2001) ("[A] litigant whose case only involved an
infringement issue had a 34% chance that the Federal Circuit would reverse the case on the basis
of erroneous claim constructions."); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim
Construction More Predictable?, 8 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 236-39 (2005) (finding a
reversal rate of 40.8% when summary affirmances were excluded and 34.5 1% if summary
affirmances are included); Andrew T. Zidel, Comment, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial
Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL
L. REV. 711, 745-46 (2003) (finding a reversal rate of 41.5% in 2001); see also Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting) ("[O]ne
study shows that the plenary standard of review has produced reversal, in whole or in part, of
almost 40% of all claim constructions since Markman I... In fact, this reversal rate, hovering
near 50%, is the worst possible. Even a rate that was much higher would provide greater
certainty.").
238 See, e.g., Holderman, supra note 227, at 10. Or, in the alternative, a party will settle the case
early to minimize litigation costs. Id.
239 See REBECCA N. EYRE, JOE S. CECIL & ERIC TOPOR, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION: A SURVEY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 23 (2008), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/patclaim.pdf/$file/patclaim.pdf (finding that of the
judges surveyed, 71% of cases resolved by summary judgment or jury trial were appealed, with
claim construction being an issue on appeal in 73% of those cases).240 See, e.g., Holderman, supra note 227, at 1 ("Something has to change when your boss, upon
reviewing your work, continues to tell you year after year that you are doing your job incorrectly
about one-third to one-half of the time, and your customers continue to tell you their costs are too
high. That is the predicament in which we United States district court judges have collectively
found ourselves during the past decade when presiding over patent litigation.").
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III. Claim Construction and Corbin's Approach to Contract
Interpretation
Although, as a descriptive matter, the Federal Circuit has been quietly
applying a Willistonian approach to claim construction, as a normative matter, the
disadvantages of this approach call for a claim construction model based more on
that of Williston's rival, Professor Arthur Corbin. Corbin attempted to address
these criticisms of Williston's approach by espousing a different view of contract
interpretation based more on the intent of the parties. As this section will show,
applying this approach when interpreting claims has the potential to avoid the
pitfalls of Willistonian interpretation and significantly improve patent claim
construction.
A. Corbin's Approach to Contract Interpretation
For Corbin, the overall goal was for a court to determine what the parties
subjectively intended a disputed term to mean.2 41 Thus, Corbin argued, "[a]
reasonably intelligent judge will not try to force that judge's own meaning upon
the parties when relevant and trustworthy evidence may show that one or both
parties intended a different meaning."
242
Corbin also recognized the inherent ambiguities of language and rejected
the concept of "plain and clear" meaning.243  Accordingly, he argued that
"[b]efore the meaning of words ... can be plain and clear, at least some of the
surrounding circumstances must be known." 244 Thus, Corbin argued that extrinsic
evidence "should be admissible even though the words of the contract may seem
to the judge to have a 'plain and clear' meaning." 245
In furtherance of these goals, Corbin's interpretative theory freely
admitted extrinsic evidence for the purpose of "discernment of the parties'
intentions. " 246 In other words, a contract consists of a "meeting of the minds" of
its parties.247 Since the document itself could not be the sole evidence of the
parties' intent, he argued, a court should consider all relevant extrinsic
241 E.g., 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.11 (rev. ed. 2002) [hereinafter
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS] ("Interpretation consists of ascertaining the meaning that the parties
intended to attach to the terms of the contract.").242 Id. § 24.10.
243 See id244 Id. § 24.7; id § 24.10.
245 Id. § 24.10; see also id § 24.7 ("When a judge refuses to consider relevant extrinsic evidence
on the ground that the meaning of stated words is plain and clear, that decision is formed by and
wholly based upon the completely extrinsic evidence of the judge's own personal education and
experience.").246 Id. § 24.9.
247 See 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 241, § 4.13. The "meeting of the minds" theory has
significant historical roots, with one scholar tracing its origins back to as early as sixteenth century
England. See Farnsworth, supra note 138, at 942-45 (discussing the historical development and
evolution of the "meeting of the minds" theory of contract law).
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evidence. 248  The types of extrinsic evidence that could be considered are
"limitless. " 249 The question was not one of admissibility, but rather that of
weighing evidence.2 5 0 Thus, all extrinsic evidence was relevant for purposes of
interpretation, regardless of whether a term was ambiguous.
2 5 1
Notably, however, this evidence could not be used to change the terms of
the writing.252 The use of extrinsic evidence was admissible "to aid in the process
of interpretation, to determine the meaning that the parties actually gave to a term,
and to expound and enforce the contract that the parties actually intended to
make."253 Thus, a party could not use such evidence to contradict, delete, or
substitute terms in the written contract.254 Similarly, although testimony of the
parties was clearly admissible, "[a] party will not be permitted to build up an
argument by means of self-serving statements."
255
In the end, Corbin's approach was incorporated into the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.256 Contract interpretation "deals with the meaning given
to language and other conduct by the parties rather than meanings established by
law. ' 257 However, "the relevant intention of a party is that manifested by him
rather than any different undisclosed intention."258 Further, "[a]ny determination
of meaning or ambiguity should only be made in the light of the relevant evidence
of the situation and relations of the parties." 259 This evidence also includes "the
subject matter of the transaction, preliminary negotiations and statements made
therein, usages of trade, and the course of dealing between the parties." 260 The
most important evidence of intent, however, remains the words themselves and
extrinsic evidence cannot contradict the terms of the writing.261 These provisions
clearly reflect Corbin's interpretative philosophy.
248 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 241, § 24.10.249 Id. ("The varieties of extrinsic evidence that may demonstrate circumstances surrounding
formation of the contract are as limitless as are the types of circumstances.").250 Id. § 24.9 ("Interpretation requires, therefore, the weighing of evidence rather than a decision
concerning admissibility.").
251 See id.
252 E.g., 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 241, § 579 (noting that such evidence "does not
vary or contradict the written words").
253 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 241, § 24.6.
254 Id. ("Contradiction, deletion, and substitution: none of these is interpretation.").
255 Id. § 24.10.
256 See, e.g., Ross & Tranen, supra note 149, at 205; see also id. (noting that "the critical aspect of
the Williston-Corbin struggle is that Corbin won").257 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 cmt. a (1979).
258 Id. The term "manifestation of intention" means an "external expression of intention." Id. § 2
cmt. b.259 Id. § 212 cmt. b; see also id § 202(1) ("Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of
all the circumstances.").26 0 Id. § 212 cmt. b.
261 See id ("But after the transaction has been shown in all its length and breadth, the words of an
integrated agreement remain the most important evidence of intention.").
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B. Corbinized Claim Construction
As previously outlined, the Federal Circuit has implicitly adopted
Williston's approach to contract interpretation in its claim construction
jurisprudence. But what would patent claim construction look like under Corbin's
interpretative approach?
Generally, adopting a Corbin-esque approach to claim construction would
shift the focus away from attempting to determine how a PHOSITA at the time of
filing would have defined a term and instead to looking at what an inventor and
the patent examiner intended that term to mean at the time of filing. In other
words, the interpretative focus would shift from an objective standard to a more
subjective one. 2 62 Thus, the ever-elusive PHOSITA standard would be
replaced-but only for purposes of claim construction. 263  Further, similar to
contract law, an inventor's secret undisclosed intent would not matter.264 Instead,
a court would be looking at the manifestations of an inventor's intent.265
Additionally, as a practical matter, changing this perspective could occur
judicially, because unlike other areas of patent law,2 66 in the context of claim
construction, the application of a PHOSITA standard is a judicial construct, as
opposed to a statutory mandate. 267  Indeed, a more subjective standard would
appear to fit within the statutory language describing claims, which requires an
applicant to "distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.' ,268  The perspective of the patent examiner, as gleaned from the
prosecution history, would also play a role, since the examiner serves as the




262 Notably, this subjective standard has historically had a role in claim construction. See, e.g.,
Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 506 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The intention of the parties,
if that intention can be collected from sources which the principles of law permit us to explore, are
entitled to great consideration."); Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928, 933 (5th
Cir. 1971) ("[A] patent is to be construed as a contract, with the intent of the parties as the
lodestar.").
263 As previously noted, courts apply the PHOSITA standard in other contexts as well. See supra
note 217.264 See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
265 See id.
266 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) ("A patent may not be obtained... if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains."); id. § 112 1 ("The
specification shall contain a written description of the invention .... in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains .... to make and use
the same...").
26 7 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575,
1649-50 (2003) (discussing the application of the PHOSITA standard to claim construction as a
"judicially created patent doctrine[]").
268 35 U.S.C. § 112 2 (emphasis added).
269 See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 204 (2006) ("The Patent
Office is charged with making certain that the U.S. public receives the benefit of the patent
bargain."). The evidentiary issues surrounding the intent of the patent examiner are discussed
infra Part III.C.2.
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In recognition of the importance of context in interpretation, all relevant
extrinsic evidence of such manifestations would be admissible for purposes of
interpreting a disputed claim term. 27  Practically, however, and similar to the
Phillips and Vitronics methodology, intrinsic evidence would still play an
important role. 27 1 For example, under Corbin's theory, the text of the claim itself
would still constitute a key, if not dispositive, manifestation of the inventor's
272intent. As Corbin noted, "[t]he more bizarre and unusual an asserted
interpretation is, the more convincing must be the testimony that supports it. Just
when the court should quit listening to testimony that white is black and that a
dollar is fifty cents is a matter for sound judicial discretion and common sense." 273
Accordingly, "[s]uch testimony does not vary or contradict the written words." 274
However, in at least some cases, using a subjective standard would allow a court
to give a more practical meaning to patent claims and avoid the irrational result of
cases such as ChefAmerica.275
Intrinsic evidence would continue to play an important role. The
specification would remain strong evidence for purposes of claim construction.
276
A patent's prosecution history would also be highly relevant for purposes of
examining the manifestations that an inventor made to the PTO during the course
of the patent application process.
2 77
Further, although the PHOSITA standard would no longer be the primary
inquiry, evidence pertaining to how a PHOSITA would interpret a term would
remain relevant for purposes of claim construction. First, such extrinsic evidence
could be relevant as evidence of a usage of trade. In contract law, a usage of trade
is "a usage having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as
to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to a particular
agreement." 278 This evidence would be relevant given the technical background
of patent examiners and an implicit assumption in most patent cases that the
inventor is a PHOSITA.279
270 See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 241, § 24.10 ("The varieties of extrinsic evidence
that may demonstrate circumstances surrounding formation of the contract are as limitless as are
the types of circumstances."); see also id. § 24.7 ("No person can determine the meaning of
written words merely by gluing his or her eyes within the four comers of a square paper.").
271 See supra Part I.B.
272 See supra note 252-54 and accompanying text.
273 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 241, § 579.
274 id
275 See supra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
276 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.277 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
278 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(1) (1979).
279 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWIH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting the
"well-settled understanding that inventors are typically persons skilled in the field of the
invention"); HARMON, supra note 228, § 6.2(a).
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The PHOSITA standard could also come into play for technical terms.280
As the Restatement (Second) of Contracts points out, "technical terms and words
of art are given their technical meaning when used in a transaction within their
technical field.",28 1  However, this applies "unless a different intention is
manifested., 282  Thus, this standard could be applied as creating a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the PHOSITA standard for technical terms. Currently,
this distinction does not apply, as the Federal Circuit routinely construes terms
such as "or," "and," and other similar terms as part of its claim construction
jurisprudence. 2 83
A shift toward a subjective intent standard would also result in a new
evidentiary tool for purposes of claim construction: embodiments of the
invention. Historically, an inventor was required to submit a working model of an
invention with their patent application when possible. 284  Currently, however,
evidence as to a commercial embodiment of an invention is generally not
permitted for purposes of claim construction.
285
Under Corbin's approach, such evidence would be relevant to the
inventor's subjective intent, analogous to a course of performance. As noted by
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, course of performance refers to the
"practical construction" of a contract by the parties following its execution.286
280 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts indicates that a technical term is "the vocabulary of a
particular place, vocation or trade, in which new words are coined and common words are
assigned new meanings." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. f (1979).
281 Id. § 202(3)(b).
282 Id. § 202(3).
283 See, e.g., TIP Sys., L.L.C. v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (construing the word "and" in a patent claim); Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc.,
512 F.3d 1338, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (construing the word "a" in a patent claim); Schumer v.
Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1311-12 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (construing the word "or" in a
patent claim).
284 See 1 MOY, supra note 30, § 3:9.285 See ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("Infringement is determined on the basis of the claims, not on the basis of a comparison with the
patentee's commercial embodiment of the claimed invention."); see also Maclaren v. B-I-W
Group Inc., 535 F.2d 1367, 1372 (2d Cir. 1976) ("It is a fundamental rule of patent law that the
scope of protection granted by a patent is defined by the language of its claims rather than by its
title, specifications, exhibits or by the commercial embodiments of the claimed invention."); Andis
Clipper Co. v. Oster Corp., 481 F. Supp. 1360, 1377 (D. Wis. 1979) ("Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, it is
impermissible in defense of a patent to read into the specifications or claims of the patent
structures or uses that may inhere in the embodiment of the patent or the uses of that embodiment
but which are not in fact in the language of the claim or claims in issue."). Further, a patent
applicant is no longer required to submit a working model of the invention. See MPEP, supra note
30, § 608.3(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.91 (2008); In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (C.C.P.A.
1982) ("We recognize that working examples are desirable in complex technologies .... Indeed,
the inclusion of such examples here might well have avoided a lengthy and, no doubt, expensive
appeal. Nevertheless, as acknowledged by the board, examples are not required to satisfy section
112 .... ).
286 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. g; see also UNIF. COMM. CODE § 1-303(a)
(2002) ("A 'course of performance' is a sequence of conduct between the parties to a particular
transaction that exists if: (1) the agreement of the parties with respect to the transaction involves
repeated occasions for performance by a party; and (2) the other party, with knowledge of the
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This evidence, however, "must be weighed in the light of the terms of the
agreement and their possible meanings."
287
Evidence as to a course of performance, although rarely dispositive in
contract law,288 can still assist a court in giving meaning to a disputed claim
term.2 89  In the context of patent claim construction, an examination of a
commercial embodiment would be indicative of not only what inventors
subjectively thought they invented, but how they intended their claims to be
interpreted as well.29 0  Again, it probably would not be dispositive, but it would
become evidence that a court could legitimately consider under Corbin's theory.
One example of how Corbinized claim construction could apply in
practice is SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., where the disputed
claim language was "regularly received television signal."29' When the patent
was granted in 1985, the only type of television signals that were broadcast were
analog signals.292 The issue faced by the court was whether the disputed claim
language encompassed digital signals, which were not developed until well after
the patent was issued.293
In examining the issue, the court began by noting that "[t]he claim
language does not limit the disputed phrases to any particular type of technology
or specify a particular type of signal format, such as analog or digital.,,294 Thus,
the court stated, if the patentees intended to limit the claim to cover only analog
signals, they would have modified the claim language to read "regularly received
analog television signal. 295  Further, nothing in the claim language or the
specification prevented the invention from receiving signals in digital format.
296
Accordingly, because "[t]he law 'does not require that an applicant describe in his
specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his
nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it, accepts the performance or
acquiesces in it without objection.").
287 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. g.288 Indeed, under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, express terms always outweigh a course
of performance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b) (1979). Accord U.C.C. §
1-303(e) (2002). Corbin also noted how course of performance evidence could be outweighed by
other forms of extrinsic evidence. See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 241, § 24.16 ("There
are many additional sources of extrinsic evidence and of methods useful in interpreting contracts.
Any of these sources may produce a degree of conviction that overpowers inferences to be drawn
from the parties' course of performance." (internal citation omitted)).
289 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. g ("The parties to an agreement know best
what they meant, and their action under it is often the strongest evidence of their meaning.").
290 See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that "it is the rare
invention that cannot be deciphered more readily from its commercial embodiment than from the
printed patent"). This would be similar to the current use of the specification.
291 358 F.3d 870, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
292 Id at 876.
293 See id. at 876-78.
294 Id at 878.
295 See id. at 880 ("Had the patentees intended to limit the disputed claim terms to 'analog'
technology, they could have easily done so by explicitly modifying the disputed claim language
with the term 'analog."').
296 id
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invention,"' the court found "no reason here to limit the scope of the claimed
invention to analog technology."
297
Chief Judge Michel disagreed with this claim construction, stating that it
"expand[ed] the scope of the [] patent far beyond what the named inventors say
they actually invented in their application, and what it describes and enables."
298
He also criticized the "literalist and abstract reading" given to the claim language
by the majority, particularly since digital television signals were "indisputably not
broadcast until the mid-1990s." 299 Chief Judge Michel concluded his opinion by
criticizing the court's trend of "providing the broadest possible scope to claim
terms... regardless of what the inventors actually invented," threatening to give
patentees broader protection than contemplated by the patent examiner.
30 0
Accordingly, "[t]he inventors here most assuredly did not invent a system that
receives digital signals; their patent cannot therefore cover such systems."
30 1
Applying Corbin's approach to claim construction would adopt Chief
Judge Michel's reasoning in SuperGuide. When faced with a patentee attempting
to include after-arising technologies within the scope of a patent claim, if the
patentee did not contemplate these technologies at the time of invention, making
claim construction more of a subjective inquiry would exclude them from being
within the scope of the claim. 302 Unless, of course, the patentee could show that
he or she manifested the intent to include these technologies as part of specific
claim terms.30 3 If so, as Chief Judge Michel noted, the patent examiner could take
the breadth of the claim into consideration as part of the validity inquiry.
30 4
As this outcome illustrates, practically, Corbinized claim construction may
result in narrower claim scope. As previously outlined, extrinsic evidence could
only be used to interpret, and not to add, terms to a claim.30 5 Further, applying a
subjective standard, an examination of an inventor's manifestations of intent
probably would not result in a disputed claim term including after-arising
technology not contemplated by the inventor. 30
6
This result arguably has its weaknesses. Limiting the definition of claim
terms to what the inventor contemplated at the time that the application was filed
297 Id. (quoting SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
298 Id. at 896 (Michel, C.J., concurring in result).
299 Id. at 896-97.
300 Id. at 898.
301 Id. He previously noted how the patentees were not even in the process of developing digital
signal technology at the time they received the patent. See id at 898 n.20.
302 Logically, the definition of after-arising technology does not indicate that it is something
considered by the inventor at the time of invention. See, e.g., In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (defining "after-arising" technology as technology that "come[s] into existence
after the filing date of an application"). Accordingly, it is doubtful that an inventor would have
manifested an intent for a disputed claim term to include technology not even fathomed at the time
of invention.
303 For example, in SuperGuide, the patentees could have shown that they intended the term
"regularly received" to include no temporal restriction.304 See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
305 See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
306 See supra note 302.
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could present problems for cutting-edge technology that is at an early stage of
development. 30 7 As one commentator noted, patent protection "may be hollow if
it does not confer the ability to prevent logical applications of the principal of the




However, it is important to note that adopting Corbin's interpretative
approach would only affect how claims are interpreted. Other devices are
available with which a patentee can broaden the scope of a patent. 30 9  The
doctrine of equivalents presents one such mechanism. 310  According to this
doctrine, if a product or process does not literally infringe on the patent, the
alleged infringer will nonetheless be liable "if there is 'equivalence' between the
elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the
patented invention." 311 Although the Supreme Court has recognized the potential
notice problems created by the doctrine, "[e]ach time the Court has considered the
doctrine, it has acknowledged this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the
appropriate incentives for innovation, and it has affirmed the doctrine over
dissents that urged a more certain rule." 312 Indeed, one of the significant benefits
of the doctrine is its ability to cover equivalent technology that was not
contemplated at the time the patent claims were written. 313 Notably, however,
there are limits to a patentee's ability to use the doctrine to expand the scope of a
claim, such as prosecution history estoppel, which prevents a patentee from using
307 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 46, at 120.
308 Id.
309 See id at 120-21 (outlining various mechanisms that allow a patentee to broaden the scope of a
patent). See generally Robert Unikel & Douglas Eveleigh, Protecting Inventors, Not Fortune
Tellers: The Available Patent Protection for After-Developed Technologies, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 81
(2006) (discussing various doctrines used by courts when faced with after-developed
technologies).310 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731-32 (2002)
("The language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe
with complete precision the range of its novelty. If patents were always interpreted by their literal
terms, their value would be greatly diminished.... The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal
terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims described.").
311 Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997); see also Festo
Corp., 535 U.S. at 733 ("The doctrine of equivalents allows the patentee to claim those
insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but which
could be created through trivial changes."). For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of
equivalents, including its historical roots and development over time, see generally 5 CHISUM,
supra note 23, § 18.02. Some commentators, however, argue that the doctrine should be
abolished. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the
Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2004).
312 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 732; see also Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420,
1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Because the doctrine of equivalents blurs the line of demarcation between
infringing and non-infringing activity, it creates a zone of uncertainty, into which competitors
tread only at their peril.").
313 Lemley, supra note 46, at 120; see also id. at 121 (noting that "the doctrine of equivalents
remains robust enough to... ensur[e] that pioneering patents retain effective scope as improvers
develop next-generation technologies").
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the doctrine of equivalents to cover subject matter that the patentee relinquished
during the patent's prosecution at the PTO.314
Further, the potential for a narrower patent scope could produce an
incentive for patentees to disclose more information during patent prosecution,
since a patentee could always stymie any potential for narrow claim construction
when drafting the patent.315  A patentee could accomplish this solution by
providing clear claim language and providing clear intrinsic evidence of the
meaning of terms.316 For example, a patentee could choose to be a lexicographer
and include a glossary of terms within the patent. 317 Another option would be to
cite to desired interpretative sources or provide additional examples of
embodiments of the invention. 318 Any of these options, when combined with the
knowledge of the precise interpretative regime a court will apply in any
subsequent litigation, provides a patentee with the ability to build the record and
compensate for any potential narrowing of patent scope. Thus, one of the
advantages of adopting Corbin's approach is that it would improve the accuracy
of the claim construction inquiry by limiting the scope of a claim to what was
contemplated by inventors, or, alternatively, at least force them to talk about it.
Corbin's interpretative approach also may improve the certainty involved
with patent claim construction by avoiding many of the problems created by the
PHOSITA standard.319 Instead of a court attempting to determine how a
PHOSITA at the time of filing would have interpreted a term, it would look at the
inventor's manifestations of his or her subjective interpretation of the term.320
This would limit the potential for hindsight bias and manipulation because a court
314 See, e.g., Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 734-35 ("Where the original application once embraced the
purported equivalent but the patentee narrowed his claims to obtain the patent or to protect its
validity, the patentee cannot assert that he lacked the words to describe the subject matter in
question.... In that instance the prosecution history has established that the inventor turned his
attention to the subject matter in question, knew the words for both the broader and narrower
claim, and affirmatively chose the latter."); see also Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am.,
Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Prosecution history estoppel acts as one check on
[the] application of the doctrine of equivalents by precluding a patentee from regaining, through
litigation, coverage of subject matter relinquished during prosecution of the application for the
patent." (internal citations omitted)); Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1107 (Fed. Cir.
1996) ("A patentee may not narrowly claim his invention and then, in the course of an
infringement suit, argue that the doctrine of equivalents should permit a finding of infringement
because the specification discloses the equivalents.").
315 See Mullally, supra note 13, at 377 ("The success of a patent having the scope desired by the
inventor depends, as it should, on the words and techniques that the inventor selects."); see also
Sage Prods., Inc., 126 F.3d at 1425 (noting the "premium on forethought in patent drafting").
116 See Mullally, supra note 13, at 376-78 (outlining methods that a patentee could use whendrafting a patent to control how it is interpreted).
317 id.
318 See id. at 378; Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 177, 206 (2005). For the PTO's current rules regarding
incorporating documents by reference, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.57 (2008).319 See supra Part II.D. Although the PHOSITA standard may still play a role in Corbinized claim
construction, the fact that it would no longer be the exclusive standard for claim interpretation
mitigates the problems previously outlined.
320 See supra Part III.B.
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could point to specific manifestations made by the inventor, which, at least in
theory, would be more ascertainable.
321
By focusing more on an inventor's subjective intent, claim construction
also minimizes the problems posed by a judge's lack of technological
background.322 Instead of being forced to learn the underlying technology, then
attempting to look at how a PHOSITA at the time of filing would have interpreted
a term, a judge could simply do what he or she frequently does in the context of
contract cases: examine evidence indicating a party's subjective intent. 323 This
approach also has the potential to limit hindsight bias from creeping into a judge's
determination of the knowledge that a PHOSITA at the time of filing would
possess.
324
Commentators, however, may disagree with this assessment. According
to one recent study, the "measure of indeterminacy" between patent claim
construction cases and contract interpretation cases was similar.325 Assuming that
this conclusion is accurate,326 adopting Corbin's approach may still have benefits
for certainty. Initially, there may be a labeling benefit for district court judges
faced with claim construction. Avoiding the current charade that courts are not
applying a theory of contract interpretation allows judges to recognize that, in
reality, claim construction is really the same process that they undergo in the
thousands of contract cases they are faced with each year.
327
Further, alleviating the current panel-dependent nature of claim
construction by adopting a consistent interpretative methodology creates
additional certainty. Although explicitly announcing that the court was
applying Williston's interpretative approach could have similar labeling benefits,
321 Theoretically, an inventor would only have one subjective meaning of a term. If evidence was
disputed, a court could simply exercise its authority to weigh the evidence. This, along with the
additional weighing of evidence at the district court level that would be necessitated by Corbinized
claim construction, could provide an opportunity to adopt a more deferential standard of review on
appeals to the Federal Circuit.
322 See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
323 Indeed, in 2008, compared to the almost 3000 patent infringement suits filed, district courts
were faced with over 34,000 filed contract cases. See 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 53, at
146 tbl.C-2A.324 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of.Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REv. 571, 592 (1998) (noting that "hindsight bias probably has less influence on
judgments made under subjective standards than it does on judgments made under objective
standards").
125 See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of Doubt: Dissent Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the
Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1088 (2006).
326 Given the sheer number of contract cases, see supra note 323, it may simply be that there is a
selection bias in the cases that Courts of Appeals decide to hear. Other commentators have
critiqued the results of Lefstin's study. See Hubbard, supra note 214, at 343 n.96.
327 See supra note 323.
328 See Cotropia, supra note 12, at 99-100 (noting the certainty benefits of selecting a consistent
claim construction methodology). Some commentators argue that uncertainty may even be
beneficial in the patent context. See generally Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees'
Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and
Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REv. 985 (1999).
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because the majority of jurisdictions adopt Corbin's approach, courts would be
more familiar with its application and hence the certainty benefit would be
greater.
329
C. The Limits of Corbinized Claim Construction
1. Notice
Perhaps the most obvious implication of adopting Corbin's approach is for
the notice function of claims. As previously outlined, one of the purposes of
claims is to inform members of the public about the scope of the claim. 330 Indeed,
"[i]nherent in our claim-based patent system is... the principle that the protected
invention is what the claims say it is, and thus that infringement can be avoided
by avoiding the language of the claims." 331 Injecting elements of a subjective
standard, by definition, appears to counteract this function, since it prevents a
third party from being able to look at the public record and understand the scope
332
of a patent. At a minimum, information costs related to finding evidence of an
inventor's manifestations regarding a disputed claim term would arguably
increase.
333
However, several factors indicate that the consequences of adopting
Corbin's approach may not be as drastic in practice. First, the practical changes
in the evidence and process used by a court when construing claims is not as
significant as one may initially fear.33 4 A competitor or member of the public
could still examine the intrinsic evidence of the patent, the state of the art at the
129 See, e.g., Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 696, 707 (2007) ("The
Corbin approach is followed in the Restatement (Second), as well as by most jurisdictions in the
United States, including most United States Circuit Courts of Appeal."); see also Johnson, supra
note 158, at 672 (noting how the Supreme Court has recognized the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts as embodying the general law of contracts in the United States).330 See supra Part I.A.
331 Slimfold Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also
PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int'l Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting
that "one of ordinary skill in the art should be able to read a patent, to discern which matter is
disclosed and discussed in the written description, and to recognize which matter has been
claimed").
132 See Benjamin Hattenbach, On Illuminating Black Holes in Patent Disclosures: Toward a
Structured Approach to Identifying Omitted Elements under the Written Description Requirement
of Patent Law, 38 HOus. L. REv. 1195, 1226 n. 173 (2001) ("If a subjective standard were adopted,
the public would no longer have a right to rely on the public record, but instead would be required
to initiate litigation and cross-examine inventors about their subjective beliefs.. ."); see also
Hubbard, supra note 214, at 355-56 (noting factors in contracts that reduce certainty and notice).
333 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Construction and Information Costs, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 57, 90 (2005) ("The definition of an invention presents unique information cost
problems. The lower the information costs encountered in defining the scope of the invention, the
easier it is for all observers to understand the critical aspect of a patent-the scope of its
exclusivity. Claim interpretation is, at its base, an information costs problem and should be judged
as such.").334 See supra Part III.B.
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time of filing, and similar evidence in order to be on notice of the claim's scope.
Also, creating a role for easily accessible extrinsic evidence such as commercial
embodiments may actually lower information costs for a PHOSITA or competitor
seeking to design-around a patent.
335
Even with these potential notice issues, Corbin's interpretative model
remains preferable because the notice function of claims under the current
approach to claim construction is minimal. As some commentators have pointed
out, the mercurial nature of the Federal Circuit's claim construction jurisprudence
makes any form of notice difficult.336 The ideological split among members of
the court, and the resulting panel-dependent nature of claim construction, only
exacerbates this problem. 337 Thus, it is questionable whether a PHOSITA or any
member of the public could simply look at a patent or its intrinsic evidence and be
on notice of the claim's scope for purposes of designing-around a patent-no
matter what claim construction approach the law adopted. 338
Even if the patent document could satisfy the notice functions of claims,
practically, many segments of the public have no desire to be aware of the
document in the first place. For example, a recent article concluded that "both
researchers and companies in component industries simply ignore patents.
Virtually everyone does it."339 Indeed, "many companies discourage employees
from reading patents," because it "presumably lessens the chance that the
335 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 61 (2008) (noting that "[p]otentially, greater use of
extrinsic evidence would strengthen the notice function" (emphasis added)); Cotropia, supra note
333, at 83-84; Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465,
486-88 (2004) (discussing how using embodiments of an invention reduce information costs).
Presumably, a competitor or inventor seeking to design-around a patent would be familiar with a
competitor's products (i.e. a commercial embodiment of the patented invention). See, e.g., Liam
Fahey, Competitor Analysis: From Data to Insight, in BUSINESS: THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE 328,
328-29 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing how competitive intelligence is a regular part of business
activity).336 See, e.g., Nard, supra note 10, at 41-43; see also Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The
Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53,
102-03 (2001) ("Even if companies were to attempt to investigate every patent under which they
face potential liability, it is unclear how much more certain of their legal rights they would be.
Patents are notoriously hard to interpret, and the outcome of patent litigation is equally difficult to
predict. The most sophisticated patent analysis may fail to clarify for the alleged infringer whether
an eventual judge and jury will find a patent valid and infringed.").
337 See supra note 10.
338 See, e.g., Bender, supra note 212, at 213-14 ("In most cases, a lay person, even an experienced
judge, is not able to fully understand the technology and to extrapolate from that knowledge about
the ordinary meaning of disputed scientific terms."); Cotropia, supra note 333, at 74 ("While
claims provide information on the boundaries of patent protection, claims by themselves, without
any further evaluation, fail to fully convey these boundaries to those who need to use them to
make patent decisions."); Hubbard, supra note 214, at 337 (noting that the notice function of
claims is "somewhat fictional because claim construction is far from being an exact science, and
reasonable people often disagree regarding the construction of crucial terms").
339 Lemley, supra note 51, at 21.
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company will be found to have knowledge of a patent." 340  Additionally, few
patent infringement cases, possibly for this reason, involve allegations of actual
copying on the part of an alleged infringer. 341 In light of the minimal notice
currently provided by patents, any detrimental effects on notice caused by
Corbinized claim construction may be mitigated.
2. Evidentiary Obstacles
The effectiveness of Corbinized claim construction is also hindered by
difficulties with determining the understanding of the patent examiner, the public
representative and the other party to the patent contract.342  Because Corbin's
theory revolves around a "meeting of the minds," 343 the proper interpretation of a
patent would therefore require consideration of how the patent examiner
understood disputed claim language. However, even if the Federal Circuit's
current doctrinal limitations344 on the use of the patent examiner's perspective
were lifted, evidentiary problems would remain. Currently, examiners are barred
from testifying in infringement proceedings. 345 This bar is premised on the fact
that examiners are deemed "quasi-judicial officials." 346
A truly Corbinized claim construction would allow inventor testimony
about his or her subjective intent to play a role. Thus, without any mechanism to
introduce evidence from patent examiners, this would result in evidence from the
patentee arguing in favor of broad claim scope without the counter-balancing
testimony of the patent examiner. Although such one-sided testimony could be
problematic, in practice, it can only get a party so far. As Corbin noted, "[a] party
will not be permitted to build up an argument by means of self-serving
statements. " 347  Further, courts are already entrusted with performing an
evidentiary gate-keeping function. 348 Why should testimony in the context of
claim construction be any different? Certainly, at least in some cases, an
340 Edwin H. Taylor & Glenn E. Von Tersch, A Proposal to Shore Up the Foundations of Patent
Law That the Underwater Line Eroded, 20 HASTINGS COMm. & ENT. L.J. 721, 737 (1998).
341 See generally Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L.
REv. 1421 (2009) (finding that only 10.9% of patent infringement complaints studied even
included allegations of copying, with copying actually established in only 1.76% of cases).342 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
343 See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
344 See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
345 MPEP, supra note 30, § 1701.01 ("It is the policy of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office that its employees, including patent examiners, will not appear as witnesses or give
testimony in legal proceedings.. ."); see Green v. Rich Iron Co., Inc., 944 F.2d 852, 854 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) ("Examiners cannot be compelled to testify about their 'mental processes' in reaching a
decision on an application. Only factual matters... are fair subjects for inquiry."); W. Elec. Co.,
Inc. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 431 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that "the general rule has been
that a patent examiner cannot be compelled to testify regarding his 'mental processes' in reaching
a decision on a patent application"); see also 15 C.F.R. § 15.16(b) (2008); 37 C.F.R. § 104.22
(2008).
346 See, e.g., W. Elec. Co., 860 F.2d at 431-32.
347 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 241, § 24.10.
348 See FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
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inventor's testimony as to his or her subjective intent could be a legitimate,
credible piece of extrinsic evidence that a court could consider.
349
Additionally, other mechanisms currently exist with which a court could
glean the examiner's understanding of claim language. The PTO could use these
mechanisms to expand the prosecution history and provide more evidence of the
examiner's intent during subsequent litigation. 350 For example, the PTO has the
ability to request interviews with applicants, the substance of which must be
documented by the primary patent examiner. 351 In recent years, the PTO has
taken measures to increase the number of these interviews.35 2 Patent examiners
also have the ability to issue "patentability reports" 353 and statements providing
their reasons for allowing a specific claim.
354
Another potential issue with considering a patent examiner's
understanding of claim language is that, during patent prosecution, an examiner
gives claim terms their "broadest reasonable construction." 355 The rationale for
this rule is the assumption that a patentee will argue for broader construction of
claim terms in infringement litigation, while arguing for a narrow construction
during patent prosecution in order to ensure that the requirements for validity are
met.356 Because this standard differs from the interpretative approach that would
be used during subsequent infringement litigation, it would arguably skew an
examiner's understanding of claim language.
357
349 See, e.g., Steams v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 669 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting
that a patentee's testimony "cannot be entirely disregarded").350 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 335, at 238-39 (arguing that patent examiners should
request more information about the meaning of claims and provide more documentation of the
patent prosecution process); see also id. at 226-27 ("Patent examiners need to record the
interpretation of claims that they use to decide patent validity and courts need to defer to these
interpretations unless they are in clear error.").
351 See MPEP, supra note 30, § 713; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.133 (2008) (outlining the parameters
for applicant interviews with the PTO).352 See PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ANNUAL
REPORT 6 (2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/advisory/reports/
ppac 2008annualrpt.pdf (noting recent PTO policy changes designed to encourage more pre-
examination interviews).
353 See MPEP, supra note 30, §§ 705-705.01(a).
354 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(e) (2008); see also John F. Duffy, On Improving the Process of Claim
Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 156-58 (2000)
(proposing that the PTO issue administrative opinions to assist courts in claim construction).
355 See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 30, § 2111; In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("[A]s an initial matter, the PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest
reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or
otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant's
specification.").
356 See, e.g., In re Buszard, 504 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d
1569, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Hubbard, supra note 214, at 366-67.
357 See, e.g., In re Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054 ("It would be inconsistent with the role assigned to the
PTO in issuing a patent to require it to interpret claims in the same manner as judges.. ."); Risch,
supra note 36, at 202 (noting that "the broadest reasonable construction rule was never intended to
define claim terms during patent enforcement").
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However, as a practical matter, the broadest reasonable construction rule
exemplifies the bargaining dynamic of contract law more than a shift in how
patent examiners understand claim terms. The rule implicitly recognizes that the
patentee will be arguing for a similarly broad interpretation in litigation.3 58 By
having a patent examiner take this stance during patent prosecution, and therefore
increasing the risk of a finding of invalidity, the rule forces an applicant to narrow
the construction of the patent's claims through the patent prosecution process.
359
Thus, the rule is more like an initial bargaining position that the patent examiner,
the de facto public representative, can use to ensure that the public receives the
best deal in exchange for the patent right.360 Accordingly, the broadest reasonable
construction rule will not have a significant effect on the efficacy of Corbinized
claim construction.
Conclusion
We should recognize the obvious: the patent system reflects a bargain
between the public and the patentee. Despite the Federal Circuit's claims to the
contrary, the fact that it has adopted a claim construction jurisprudence that
mirrors Williston's interpretative theory provides proof that the contract analogy
has merit. Of the two primary theories of contract interpretation, however, the
Federal Circuit chose to adopt the approach that has been rejected by most
jurisdictions. Why should patent claim construction continue to mirror an
interpretative theory rejected by most courts, particularly in light of the unique
problems that this theory has spawned when applied in the patent context?
Instead, courts should construe claims according to Corbin's theory and
provide a greater role for the subjective intent of the patentee and the patent
examiner, as well as extrinsic evidence. While this approach certainly would not
be a panacea for all that ails the modem patent system in the United States, it
would be a significant step toward addressing many of the problems that have
arisen under the current claim construction framework, and would unite these
different areas of the law. That is the promise of Corbinized claim construction.
358 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 46, at 110 ("Patent owners would like their patent claims to be
construed broadly in infringement proceedings, so that they cover defendants' products, but would
generally like their claims to be construed narrowly when it comes to validity, to avoid the risk of
either treading on the prior art or claiming more than the patentee has enabled or described.").359 See Hubbard, supra note 214, at 366-67. See generally Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of
Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 753 (2004) (discussing the back and forth of
negotiating and bargaining).
360 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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